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GENDER AND INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS:
DATA AND MYTHS
Julia Lamber*
This Article explores what nondiscrimination means in the context of intercolle-
giate athletics. After reviewing the Department of Education's controversial Title
IX Policy Interpretation, it critically examines the analytical framework used in
Title IX athletic cases and concludes that commonly made analogies to litigation
under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act are inapt. A major part of the Article
is an empirical study, looking first at gender equity plans written by institutions
of higher education for the National Collegiate Athletic Association and then at
data collected from more than 325 institutions pursuant to the Equity in Athlet-
ics Disclosure Act. Understanding Title IX and its application to intercollegiate
athletics is another context in which to work out the meaning of equality. The
purpose of college athletics is for students to learn the kinds of discipline, coopera-
tion, and ability to meet challenges that often produce success in later public and
private life. Women are disadvantaged because they are seen to lack these quali-
ties. Giving women a chance to show they understand team play and competitive
spirit would be a great accomplishment.
INTRODUCTION
As a new civil rights lawyer in 1975, my first assignment was to
observe the hearings the House of Representatives was conducting
on Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.' The Office for
Civil Rights, where I had worked for one week, had the primary
responsibility for writing the regulation that implemented the stat-
ute. The regulation and this hearing process posed several difficult
issues. First, the regulation was much more detailed than any that
the Office for Civil Rights in Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare had ever written. Second, the regulation was subject
* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law. BA. 1969, DePauw University;
J.D. 1972, Indiana University at Bloomington. For five years (1993-98), I served as Dean for
Women's Affairs for the Bloomington campus at Indiana University. One of the continuing
interests of that office was gender equity in athletics. As Dean, I met with administrators at
other Big Ten institutions whose jobs also included advocacy on women's issues. Both the
criticism and support for various aspects of Title IX and its application to athletics were part
of our discussions. Of course, the views expressed here are mine and not necessarily those
of the Office for Women's Affairs or Indiana University. A special thanks toJi Lie for her
assistance with the data analysis.
1. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994).
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to a "legislative veto" then popular with Congress. More impor-
tantly, however, it provided the first opportunity for public
comment on the subject of gender discrimination and big-time
intercollegiate athletics. By the end of the summer, Congress had
failed to disapprove the regulation, so it took effect without subse-
quent legal battles.
For several reasons the regulation, referred to as the Title IX
regulation,3 did not really have an effect on intercollegiate athlet-
ics for more than fifteen years. First, there was the expected
caution of an administrative agency charged with applying and in-
terpreting a new statute in an uncharted area. Second, there were
legal attacks, challenging various provisions of the statute and its
regulation on their face.4 Finally, new avenues of redress became
available, with the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in 1992 that private
plaintiffs may receive monetary damages for a violation of Title
IX.5
Based on the actual experiences of more than 325 institutions of
higher education, this Article explores what nondiscrimination
means in the context of intercollegiate athletics under Tide IX and
whether institutions are in compliance with Tide IX. Part I exam-
ines the controversial Tide IX Policy Interpretation, which explains
in detail how Title IX applies to intercollegiate athletics, and then
presents two recent court decisions to illustrate opposing views
about this official policy. This Part describes the proportionality
test relied upon by plaintiffs, the lack of interest argument ad-
vanced by institutions, and the analysis of the federal courts in
specific factual contexts. Part II critically examines the analytical
framework used in Title IX athletic cases and concludes that com-
monly made analogies to litigation under Tide VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act are inapt. Part III considers the constitutional di-
mension of the athletics issue, including the implications of the
Supreme Court's recent decision concerning single-sex education.
2. The Title IX regulation was signed by President Gerald Ford on May 27, 1975, and
submitted to Congress for review pursuant to section 431 (d) (1) of the General Education
Provisions Act (GEPA), which allowed Congress forty-five days in which to disapprove the
regulation (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1232(d)(1), repealed 1994, PL 103-382, § 247). Congress
did not disprove the regulation and it became effective onJuly 21, 1975. Nondiscrimination
on the Basis of Sex in Education Program and Activities Receiving or Benefiting From Fed-
eral Financial Assistance, 45 C.F.R. § 86.1 (2000).
3. 45 C.F.R. § 86.1 (2000).
4. See, e.g., Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 572 (1984) (holding that Title IX
did not apply to programs that did not receive direct federal funds); North Haven Bd. of
Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 539 (1982) (ruling that Title IX covered discrimination in em-
ployment in addition to discrimination against students); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S.
677, 708 (1979) (holding that Title IX created a private cause of action).
5. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992).
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Part IV presents an analysis of empirical data, looking first at gen-
der equity plans written by institutions of higher education for the
National Collegiate Athletic Association and then at data that I col-
lected from more than 325 institutions pursuant to the Equity in
Athletics Disclosure Act.6
Finally, the Article concludes that analogies between discrimina-
tion in athletics under Title IX and workplace discrimination
under Title VII are inappropriate. Opponents of Title IX argue
that Title VII's analytical framework should be used to interpret
Title IX. They also argue that the Title IX Policy Interpretation and
recent cases have turned Title IX into a quota statute; the Article
contends that these critics misunderstand both the case law and
the term "quota." Further, these opponents also fail to take into
consideration the circumstances of today's intercollegiate athletics,
with its focus on separate teams for women and men. These ob-
servers misplace their reliance on Tite VII and fail to consider the
factual differences in employment and athletics.
The Article also rejects four myths surrounding discussions of
Title IX and intercollegiate athletics. First, opponents argue that
football and Tite IX compliance are mutually exclusive. Several
articles have discussed the question in the abstract, but the data set
forth in Part IV shows that schools with football programs do com-
ply with Title IX. In fact, the existence of a football program may
make it easier to have successful women's athletic programs. Sec-
ond, opponents of Title IX claim that men's teams have been
eliminated to pay for women's teams. The data submitted by
higher education institutions, however, are not consistent with this
claim. Third, opponents of Title IX claim that football and men's
basketball pay for women's sports, and therefore, they should be
excused from the requirements of Title IX. Football and men's
basketball produce positive net revenues at some schools, particu-
larly big-time programs, but they do not produce positive net
revenues at smaller schools or at the big-time athletic programs
that do not sponsor football. Even if all schools produced positive
net revenues, there is no reason this factor should lead to exempt-
ing those men's sports. Fourth, opponents of the Title IX Policy
Interpretation argue that declining athletic budgets mean that men
will suffer in order to enhance women's teams or, in the alterna-
tive, that intercollegiate athletics will be enhanced at the expense
of academics. The data suggests that, at least at many institutions,
athletic budgets are not declining and thus can accommodate the
goals of Title IX.
6. 20 U.S.C. § 1092(g) (1994).
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Understanding Title IX and its application to intercollegiate
athletics is important for several reasons. On the immediate level,
it means the difference between providing opportunities for
women or not; the difference between enjoying equivalent athletic
programs or not. On a more theoretical level, Title IX and its ap-
plication to intercollegiate athletics is another context in which to
consider the meaning of equality. Equality is an elusive concept,
and it is crucial to have many different contexts in which to clarify
the concept. Finally, equality in athletics is important for its own
sake. Intercollegiate athletics does not exist simply to give athletes,
fans, or supporters something to do on Saturday afternoon. Its
purpose is for students to learn the kinds of discipline, coopera-
tion, and ability to meet challenges that often produce success in
later public and private life. Women are disadvantaged because
they are seen as incapable of cultivating these qualities. Giving
women a chance to show they understand team play and competi-
tive spirit would be a great accomplishment.!
I. TITLE IX POLICY INTERPRETATION
A. The Statute and Rules
In 1972, Congress passed Title IX of the Education Amend-
ments, which provides "[n]o person ... shall, on the basis of sex,
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activ-
ity receiving Federal financial assistance. ""
In 1974, Congress required the Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare (HEW) to prepare and propose regulations to
implement Title IX including, "with respect to intercollegiate
athletic activities[,] reasonable provisions considering the nature
of particular sports."9 These original regulations have two
provisions specifically applicable to athletics. First, there is a
specific regulatory provision that speaks about athletic scholarships
7. For general discussions of Tide IX and intercollegiate athletics, see ELLEN J. VAR-
GYAS, BREAKING DowN BARRIERS: A LEGAL GUIDE TO TITLE IX (1994); B. Glenn George,
Who Plays and Who Pays: Defining Equality in Intercollegiate Athletics, 1995 Wis. L. REv. 647;
Diane Heckman, Women & Athletics: A Twenty Year Retrospective on Title IX 9 U. MIAMI ENT. &
SPORTS L. REv. 1 (1992); Mark Kelman, (Why) Does Gender Equity in College Athletics Entail
Gender Equality, 7 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 63 (1997).
8. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a) (1994).
9. Gender and Athletics Act, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 844, 88 Stat. 484, 612 (1974).
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within the more general section on financial aid.' ° The rule for
athletic scholarships is similar to the general rule on financial aid:
institutions must provide reasonable opportunities for such awards
for men and women in proportion to the number of students
participating in intercollegiate athletics."
Second, there is the more general provision that outlines the
equal opportunity requirements of Title IX for athletics programs,
including the basic rule that institutions should not provide athlet-
ics separately on the basis of sex." This section also states when
separate teams are permissible (but not required) and provides a
list of specific factors to consider in assessing whether equal oppor-
tunities are available in a particular athletic program." In brief, the
regulation says that in determining whether equal opportunities
are available, the government will consider if the selection of
sports and levels of competition effectively accommodate the in-
terests and abilities of male and female students and if those
students enjoy equivalent benefits, opportunities, and treatment
within the athletic program.14
Finally, the regulation provides for a three-year adjustment pe-
riod for institutions of higher education.' 5 When this transition
period ended in July 1978 and the Office for Civil Rights (OCR),
the office within HEW that had the responsibility for enforcing
Title IX, began to investigate complaints, the department decided
further guidance was needed. The OCR proposed a policy inter-
preting Title IX's application to intercollegiate athletics in
December 197816 and published a final Policy Interpretation in De-
cember 1979.'
7
10. Athletic Scholarships, 45 C.F.R. § 86.37(c) (2000).
11. Id.
12. Athletics, 45 C.F.R. § 86.41 (a).
13. Separate Teams, 45 C.F.R. § 86.41 (b). The regulation provides that a university
may offer separate teams for men and women "where selection for such teams is based
upon competitive skill or the activity involved is a contact sport." Id. The regulation contin-
ues, however, that if a university offers a separate team for members of only one sex and
athletic opportunities are limited for members of the excluded sex, the university must
allow members of the excluded sex to try out for the single sex team unless the sport in-
volved is a contact sport. Id. § 86.41 (c).
14. Id.
15. Adjustment Period, 45 C.F.R. § 86.41 (d).
16. Tide IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 43 Fed. Reg. 58,070 (Dec. 11, 1978).
17. Tide IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972; A Policy Interpretation: Title IX
and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (Dec. 11, 1979). The 1979 Policy Interpre-
tation is not a "regulation" as contemplated by the Title IX statute and thus is distinct from
the Title IX regulation promulgated in 1975. The Policy Interpretation is the agency's in-
terpretation of its own regulation. It does not have the force of law, but it is entitled to
substantial deference. The difference between the statute, the regulation, and the Policy
Interpretation is further discussed infra text accompanying notes 113-40, 184-92.
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1. Title IX Policy Interpretation of 1979-The final Policy Interpre-
tation gives specific meaning to the "equal athletic opportunity"
requirement of the Title IX regulation and details the factors to be
considered in assessing an institution's compliance with Title IX.18
It is divided into three sections: financial assistance,' 9 program
components,' ° and access to athletic opportunities.2 The Policy In-
terpretation reiterates that "proportionately equal amounts" is the
guiding principle for athletic financial assistance. Athletic schol-
arships should be given to men and women in proportion to the
number of men and women participants in the institution's ath-
letic program. The data discussed in Part IV show that this is the
area in which institutions have made significant improvement, and
many are in compliance.
The second section of the Policy Interpretation states that
"equivalence" is the guiding principle in determining compliance
in program components, such as recruitment, equipment, travel,
or practice times. 4 The OCR will compare the availability, quality,
and types of benefits, opportunities, and treatment afforded male
and female athletes.25 The Policy Interpretation then details the fac-
tors OCR will consider in assessing compliance in a specific26
program area. For example, the section on travel and per diem
allowances states that compliance will be assessed by examining the
equivalence for men and women of modes of transportation, hous-
ing furnished during travel, length of stay before and after the
competitive event, per diem allowances, and dining arrange-
27ments. This part of the Policy Interpretation also effectuates the
In 1979, Congress divided the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW)
into the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Department of Educa-
tion. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3510 (1994) (describing the different responsibilities of HHS
and the Department of Education). The Department of Education then reissued the Title
IX regulation without change in 1980, and its Office for Civil Rights now has primary re-
sponsibility for enforcing Title IX. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education
Programs and Activities Receiving or Benefiting from Federal Financial Assistance, 34 C.F.R.
§ 106 (2000).
18. Equal Opportunity, 45 C.F.R. § 86.41 (c) (2000).
19. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; A Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed.
Reg. 71,413, 71,415 (Dec. 11, 1979).
20. Id. at 71,415-17.
21. Id. at 71,417-18.
22. Id. at 71,415.
23. See infra note 395.
24. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; A Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed.
Reg. at 71,415-17.
25 See id.
26. Id. at 71,416-17.
27. Id. at 71,416.
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Javits Amendment, 28 which requires the Tide IX regulation to take
into account "the nature of particular sports." The section pro-
vides that institutions are in compliance with Tide IX even if
treatment, benefits, or opportunities are not equivalent, as long as
those differences result from nondiscriminatory factors, such as
rules of play, rate of injury resulting from participation, or the na-
ture of facilities required for competition." The Policy Interpretation
specifically notes "differences involving such factors will occur in
programs offering football, and consequently these differences will
favor men."01 Provided the institution meets the sports specific
needs of both men and women, "differences in particular program
components will be found to be justifiable."
Information from institutional gender equity plans discussed in
Part IV shows that this is also an area in which institutions have
made significant improvements.33 Some changes need to be made
and can be readily implemented, such as standardizing the num-
ber of players per room on road trips, the per diem allowance
during travel, and the means of transportation to games away from
campus. Other changes are more difficult to implement or even to
acknowledge as necessary. For example, it may be difficult to pro-
vide "equivalent" access to athletic facilities, especially if there is
only one primary sports arena and only one "prime" practice time.
The most difficult aspect in assessing compliance in this area is
that, other than easily measured program components, compli-
ance depends on information provided by current athletes. These
men and women are understandably reluctant to complain or "go
public" about possible program inequities, in part because disclo-
sure could seriously jeopardize their intercollegiate athletic
careers.
The third part of the Policy Interpretation implements the
regulation's requirement that institutions select sports and levels
of competition to effectively accommodate the interests and
abilities of students. 4 This section states that OCR will assess
compliance by examining the determination of athletic interests
and abilities of students, the selection of sports offered, and the
levels of competition available, including the opportunity for team
28. Gender and Athletics Act, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 844, 88 Stat. 484, 612 (1974).
29. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 9.
30. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; A Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed.
Reg. at 71,415-16.
31. Id. at 71,416.
32. Id.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 354-68.
34. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; A Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed.
Reg. at 71,417-18.
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sports . 5 The Policy Interpretation gives institutions discretion on how
to determine student interest, latitude to decide what sports to
offer and sponsor, and a choice of integrated or sex-segregated
teams.
36
In contrast, the Policy Interpretation is fairly specific about deter-
mining levels of competitionY.3 The basic rule in determining levels
of competition is that institutions "must provide both the oppor-
tunity for individuals of each sex to participate in intercollegiate
competition, and for athletes of each sex to have competitive team
schedules which equally reflect their abilities."3 Institutions may
comply in one of three ways: first, they can show that intercolle-
giate participation opportunities for male and female students are
substantially proportionate to their respective enrollments; second,
if participation rates are not substantially proportionate, the insti-
tutions can show a history and continuing practice of program
expansion that is responsive to the student interests and abilities of
the underrepresented sex; third, if neither of the two previous
conditions is met, institutions can show that the present athletic
program fully and effectively accommodates the interests and abili-
ties of the members of the underrepresented sex.39 Most court
decisions about intercollegiate athletics have deferred to the Policy
Interpretation.40 Because the second and third options apply in lim-
ited situations, some commentators argue that these court
decisions require institutions to use proportionality, ensuring that
the number of athletes is substantially proportionate to the gender
composition of its undergraduate population.'
2. Proportionality-This three-part test, used to determine
whether an institution has effectively accommodated student in-
terest and ability, is the most controversial part of the 1979 Policy
Interpretation. Indeed, the casual observer might think that propor-
tionate participation rates define compliance with Tide IX. The
fact that the Policy Interpretation adopts a bright-line definition of
35. Id. at 71,417.
36. Id. at 71,417-18.
37. Id. at 71,418.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. E.g., Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 1999); Cohen v.
Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155 (lst Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1186 (1997); Roberts v. Colo.
State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993); Kelley v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 832 F.
Supp. 237 (C.D. Ill. 1993), affld, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994). But see Pederson v. La. State
Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892 (M.D. La. 1996) (no deference), affd in part, rev'd in part, 201 F.3d
388 (5th Cir. 2000). These cases are discussed infra, Parts I.B and II.
41. E.g., George, supra note 7, at 654 (stating that proportionality is "the only realistic
means of satisfying OCR's definition of equitable accommodation").
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equal athletic opportunity, and that the courts have limited institu-
tions' ability to present alternative views of nondiscrimination
under Title IX, support this impression. The data from higher
education institutions discussed in Part IV illustrates that institu-
tions have been the least successful in meeting this portion of the
42Policy Interpretatzon.
The best feature of the substantial proportionality measure is its
relative specificity. As an enforcement standard, it is easily under-
stood and readily measured. In the past, institutions may have
defined "athletic participant" in different ways: for example, ex-
cluding "redshirts", who practice with the team and receive athletic
aid but do not participate in games, or counting available slots on
teams (athletic opportunities) as opposed to students who in fact
participate in the sport at the institution (participants). But once
regulations or judicial decisions eliminate these variations,
"athletic participant" is easy to implement and to apply across insti-
tutions. Thus, it is a relatively easy task to compare the number
and sex of an institution's athletes with the gender composition of
its undergraduate population. Moreover, it is also easy to compare
one institution's progress with others.
The proportionality test's main virtue, specificity, is also its most
significant drawback and is controversial for several reasons. The
most vocal opponents attack the standard as an impermissible
quota.3 Others argue that participation rates address only one as-
pect of compliance with Title IX and that whether an institution is
in violation of Title IX ought to take into account how an institu-
tion is complying in other parts of its athletic program.44 Others
complain that the Policy Interpretation's "substantial proportionality"
standard is too vague.45 Still other critics assert that the standard is
42. See infra text accompanying notes 384-92.
43. E.g., David Aronberg, Crumbling Foundations: Why Recent Judicial and Legislative
Challenges to Title IX May Signal its Demise, 47 FLA. L. REv. 741 (1995);Jennifer Lynn Botelho,
The Cohen Court's Reading of Title IX: Does It Really Promote a De Facto Quota Scheme? 33 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 743 (1999); Donald C. Mahoney, Taking a Shot at the Title: A Critical Review of
Judicial and Administrative Interpretations of Title IX as Applied to Intercollegiate Athletic Programs,
27 CONN. L. REv. 943 (1995); Charles Spitz, Gender Equity In Intercollegiate Athletics as Man-
dated by Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972: Fair or Foul? 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J.
621 (1997); Darryl Wilson, Parity Bowl IX: Barrier Breakers v. Common Sense Makers: The Serpen-
tine Struggle for Gender Diversity in Collegiate Athletics, 27 CUMB. L. REv. 397 (1996).
44. Brian A. Snow & William E. Thro, Still on the Sidelines: Developing the Non-
Discrimination Paradigm Under Title IX, 3 DUKEJ. GENDER L. & POL'Y 1, 19-20 (1996).
45. Andrew A. Ingram, Comment, Civil Rights: Title IX and College Athletics: Is There a
Viable Compromise?, 48 OKLA. L. REv. 755, 769-72 (1995).
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impossible to meet 46 or that institutions will only be able to comply
at the expense of male athletics or African American athletes.
The argument that proportionality is an improper quota relies
upon language in Tide IX, the current unpopularity of affirmative
action, and a particular interpretation of the proportionality test.
Title IX provides that no institution will be required
to grant preferential or disparate treatment to the members
of one sex on account of an imbalance which may exist with
respect to the total number or percentage of persons of that
sex... in comparison with the total number or percentage of
persons of that sex in any community, State, section, or other
48
area.
Critics of the proportionality test argue that it mandates statisti-
cal balancing in violation of this provision. 49 They argue that this
section of Title IX would not allow a statistical balancing of en-
rollments in such classes as chemistry, political science, or
elementary education.it Most courts that have considered the
quota argument have rejected it, reasoning in part, that propor-
tionate participation rates are only one way of complying with Title
IX and are not required.' Further, proportionate participation
rates are different from quotas in hiring and admission decisions.
46. Aronberg, supra note 43, at 782; Jeffrey Ferrier, Title IX Leaves Some Athletes Asking,
"Can We Play Too?" 44 CATH. U. L. RaV. 841,865 (1995).
47. Wilson, supra note 43, at 422. 1 also use the term "critic" to describe the collective
voices of coaches, administrators, writers, and other observers who are opposed to Title IX
or its application to intercollegiate athletics. One of the most vocal critics is Speaker of the
House Dennis Hastert (R. Ill.), who is a former men's wrestling coach and former president
of the National Wrestling Coaches Association. He has been an outspoken advocate for
men's sports interests and in 1994 led a congressional attack on OCR's three-part test. Over-
sight Activities of the Olympic Comm.: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs, Foreign
Commerce and Tourism of the Senate Comm. of Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 103d Cong. 10-12
(1994) (testifying that schools are meeting Title IX by cutting men's sports rather than
adding women's sports); see also Deborah Brake & Elizabeth Catlin, The Path of Most Resis-
tance: The Long Road Toward Gender Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics, 3 DuKE J. GENDER L. &
POL'y 51, 69-74 (1996) (discussing critics).
48. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (1994).
49. See Aronberg, supra note 43, at 783-84; Botelho, supra note 43, at 774; Mahoney,
supra note 43, at 744.
50. See Kelley v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 35 F.3d 265, 270 (7th Cir. 1994) (argument
of male athletes); see also testimony of then Representative Hastert in Hearings on Title IX,
infra note 98, at 14-17.
51. E.g., Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 1999); Cohen v.
Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1186 (1997); Roberts v. Colo.
State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993); Kelley v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 832 F.
Supp. 237 (C.D. II. 1993), affd, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994). But see Pederson v. La. State
Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892 (M.D. La. 1996), afJfd in part, rev'd in part, 201 F.3d 388 (5th Cir.
2000).
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The quota argument is misplaced as long as sex-segregated teams
are the norm in intercollegiate athletics. Sex-segregated teams
mean that institutions start with quotas, or fixed numbers of par-
ticipants, because institutions decide in advance what teams to
sponsor and how many athletes can participate. The quota argu-
ment, then, is only an argument about how to divide those
opportunities, whether to change from the current two-thirds male
to one-third female quota to something more closely approximat-
ing equal treatment or gender equality.
5
The argument that proportionality comes at the cost of hurting
male or black athletes is similar to the quota argument. Because
women are underrepresented in intercollegiate athletics, attempts
to achieve participation rates proportionate to undergraduate en-
rollments must either expand women's opportunities or decrease
men's opportunities. Critics argue that most schools are not add-
ing new resources to their intercollegiate athletic budgets or
operations, so most institutions have eliminated men's teams or
otherwise limited men's athletic opportunities in order to comply
with Title IX.53 More infuriating to these critics, courts have swept
aside Title IX challenges brought by male athletes or institutions
concerning this matter. An examination of participation rates
and the number of sports offered at institutions does not support
the view that most schools eliminate men's teams.55 Even if it did,
one might think that male athletes would do better focusing on
how athletic dollars are apportioned within men's athletics. Men
should understand that cuts in sports such as gymnastics or wres-
tling support additional players in football or increased spending
in men's basketball, not a women's volleyball team. It is only when
athletic programs that offer substantially more athletic opportuni-
ties for men than for women choose to support large numbers of
participants in football or large expenditures in other sports, such
as men's basketball or soccer, that the institutions are faced with
cutting men's athletic opportunities. An examination of several
institutional strategic plans to achieve gender equity suggests that
institutions eliminate men's sports only as a last resort.
56
Critics of proportionality also attempt to pit gender equity
against racial equality, arguing that women's expanded sports
52. Brake & Catlin, supra note 47, at 78.
53. SeeAronberg, supra note 43, at 769; Spitz, supra note 43, at 650-54.
54. See, e.g., Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 1999); Boula-
hanis v. Bd. of Regents, Ill. State Univ., 198 F.3d 633, 636-39 (7th Cir. 1999); Kelley v. Bd. of
Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994).
55. See infra text accompanying notes 384-92, 407.
56. See infra text accompanying notes 366-68.
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opportunities are primarily in "country club sports", benefiting
white women at the expense of male African American athletes.17 It
is not an uncommon tactic to pit the diverse interests of minority
groups against one another, yet expansion of women's athletic op-
portunity is not the cause of reduced athletic opportunities for
men. Uneven distribution of male athletic opportunities is the
cause.58 Even if African American athletes were somehow exempt
from gender equity goals, the attack on women is factually unsup-
portable. African Americans who participate in intercollegiate
athletics do so disproportionately in football, basketball, and
track;59 these sports are rarely the ones Tite IX opponents claim
institutions have eliminated.0 Even if institutions take seriously
calls to limit opportunities in football, it seems more likely that the
eliminated 120th bench sitter will also be a "country club" player
rather than an African American athlete.6'
The proportionality rule is also criticized as impossible to meet
or too vague to understand. Critics who argue that proportionate
participation rates are impossible point out that few institutions
are in compliance and that those with "big time" football programs
are at an unfair disadvantage. These football programs typically
have 120 men on the roster, and because there are no sports that
call for as many women, they argue it is unfair to expect propor-
tionality.63 These institutions will still not be in compliance with the
Policy Interpretation, the argument goes, even if everything else is
equal or proportionate. Nevertheless, proportionality is impossible
only if it is equally impossible to change the distribution of male
athletic opportunities. Moreover, data on participation rates dis-
cussed below does not support this claim of impossibility.64
The proportionality measure is too vague, according to this ar-
gtiment, because neither the Policy Interpretation nor the courts
57. Debra E. Blum, Competing Equities? Some Fear that Steps to Help Female Athletes May
Curb Opportunities for Blacks, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. May 26, 1995, at A37.
58. See infra Part IV.
59. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 43, at 422.
60. See Alfred Dennis Mathewson, Black Women, Gender Equity, and the Function at the
Junction, 6 MARQ. SPORTS LJ. 239, 260-62 (1996).
61. Susan M. Shook, The Title IX Tug-of-War and Intercollegiate Athletics in the 1990's:
Nonrevenue Men's Teams Join Women Athletes in the Scramble for Survival, 71 IND. LJ. 773, 808-
14(1996).
62. See Aronberg, supra note 43, at 782; Ferrier, supra note 46, at 865.
63. See generally Robert C. Farrell, Title IX or College Football 32 Hous. L. REv. 993,
1015-20 (1995) (arguing that although governmental interests in promoting safety, reme-
dying the effects of past discrimination, and promoting equality of opportunity for women
may be legitimate, it may be difficult to prove that these interests are substantially related to
gender-based classifications in sport).
64. See infra text accompanying notes 388-92, 402-04.
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have defined "substantial proportionality."65 Some observers argue
that statistical tests should be applied to determine how much a
university can vary from exact proportionality and still remain in
compliance.66 There is no evidence, however, that the Policy Inter-
pretation's use of "substantial" was a term of art; rather it is used as
common understanding dictates, to account for the year-to-year
fluctuations in undergraduate enrollments and the minor changes
in athletic opportunities.67
Finally, critics complain about court decisions holding an insti-
tution in noncompliance with Title IX solely because of its failure
to satisfy the three-part test.66 According to this argument, the Title
IX regulation provides ten factors to use in assessing whether an
institution is providing "equal athletic opportunity for members of
both sexes." 69 The three-part test measures access, asking only
about the accommodation of student interests and abilities, which
is but one of these factors. To find a violation of Title IX on the
basis of this factor alone, the argument continues, is to ignore the
other nine factors.76 Such a conclusion suggests that strengths in
these other factors are irrelevant to offset a weakness in the access
factor. The Policy Interpretation states that OCR will make a compli-
ance determination based on whether disparities exist "in the
institution's program as a whole."71 It also provides, however, that
when "disparities in individual segments of the program ... are
substantial enough in and of themselves to deny equality of ath-
letic opportunity,"72 a finding of noncompliance will follow. It
makes sense to look at all facets of an athletic program, but if fewer
women can compete, it is little consolation to those excluded that
the ones who do compete are treated fairly.
Thus, each critique of the proportionality rule can be traced to
the fundamental notion that men are more interested in sports
than women, and therefore men should have the bulk of
65. Ingrum, supra note 45, at 769-71.
66. Walter B. Connolly & Jeffrey D. Adelman, A University's Defense to a Title IX Gender
Equity in Athletics Lawsuit: Congress Never Intended Gender Equity Based on Student Body Ratios,
71 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 845, 901-03 (1994); Mary W. Gray, The Concept of Substantial Pro-
portionality in Title IX Athletics Cases, 3 DuKEJ. GENDER L. & POL'Y 165, 184-88 (1996).
67. See Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Clarification of Intercollegiate Ath-
letics Policy Guidance: The Three Part Test 2 (Jan. 16, 1996) [hereinafter Policy
Clarification].
68. E.g., Snow & Thro, supra note 44, at 19-20.
69. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs and Activities Re-
ceiving or Benefiting from Federal Financial Assistance, 34 C.F.R § 106.41 (c) (1999).
70. See Snow & Thro, supra note 44, at 19-20.
71. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; A Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed.
Reg. 71,413, 71,418 (Dec. 11, 1979).
72. Id.
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intercollegiate opportunities. Any compliance rule that does not
take into account women's lesser interest is bound to be seen as a
quota or to require reverse discrimination against men. The
argument that blacks will be disproportionately harmed raises the
stakes. Opponents of the proportionality rule are so certain of the
lesser interest of women that any argument premised on equal
participation is untenable.
3. Lack of Interest-The argument that women lack interest in
sports is more directly relevant to the third prong of the "effective
accommodation" test of the Policy Interpretation. That is, institutions
can show that their present athletic program fully and effectively
accommodates the interests and abilities of the members of the
underrepresented sex, without showing substantial proportionality
or a history of program expansion. The meaning and scope of this
third prong is also subject to controversy.74
Litigants and commentators have argued that, under the third
prong, institutions may be in compliance with Title IX and its
regulation if they meet the interests of women to the same extent
that they meet the interests of men.75 In assessing equal treatment
under the Policy Interpretation, these litigants and commentators
argue for the seemingly common sense notion that because ath-
letic programs do not meet the interests and abilities of all men,
76they need not meet the interests and abilities of all women. To
require otherwise, they argue, is reverse discrimination against
men and turns the Title IX nondiscrimination statute into an af-
firmative action requirement for women.77 Under this view, the
appropriate measure would be to compare athletes' participation
opportunities with the relative interest of male and female stu-
dents, as measured by the institution, rather than to use the
73. See Michael Straubel, Gender Equity, College Sports, Title IX and Group Rights: A
Coach's View, 62 BROOK. L. REv. 1039, 1041-42, 1071-72 (arguing that fewer women than
men take advantage of existing collegiate athletic opportunities and that a more fair pro-
portionality test would be based on high school participation rates).
74. A minor controversy arose in terms of prong two. The OCR has made it clear that
expanding women's athletic opportunities must be a continuing effort and that the second
prong did not protect institutions that added women's team in the late seventies and early
eighties but have done nothing since then. Policy Clarification, supra note 67, at 4-6 (1996).
75. See, e.g., Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal State Univs., 198 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 1999); Cohen
v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996); Connolly & Adelman, supra note 66, at 880-93.
76. See, e.g., Neal, 198 F.3d at 767; Cohen, 101 F.3d at 174-76; Connolly & Adelman, su-
pra note 66, at 880-82.
77. See, e.g., Neal, 198 F.3d at 771-72; Cohen, 101 F.3d at 169-70; Connolly & Adelman,
supra note 66, at 889.
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percentage of each sex in the undergraduate enrollment as a
proxy for such interest."'
Courts have rejected this interpretation of Title IX, giving total
deference to the government agency, its regulation, and its Policy
Interpretation.79 After deciding the Policy Interpretation is entitled to
great deference,8 ° courts read the third prong to require institu-
tions to show that the interest and abilities of the members of the
underrepresented sex have been "fully and effectively accommo-
dated by the present program."81 It is very difficult to meet this
requirement and cut women's teams when women remain under-
represented in intercollegiate athletics. An existing team shows
that there is interest, competitive opportunities in the area, and
capable athletes at the university.
The other difficulty with the institutions' version of the accom-
modation requirement is the inherent difficulty of measuring
student athletic interest and ability. First, there is the question of
how to measure interest. The OCR does not prescribe specific sur-
vey instruments or scientific validations of assessments.82 Instead, it
gives the institutions discretion in how to determine student inter-
est. It does, however, warn institutions that OCR expects
institutional assessments to reach a wide audience and to be open-
ended regarding the sports in which students can express inter-
est.83 Second, there is the question of whom to survey. Government
regulations suggest that institutions should survey their current
student populations, but students who compete in intercollegiate
athletics are recruited especially to do so; if their athletic oppor-
tunities were not available at the institution, they might not be
there. That is, institutions create interest in their programs; in-
tercollegiate football and basketball programs do not simply
emerge from the student bodies but rather are the products of
very careful administrative design. In contrast, current student
78. Actually this suggestion contemplates a change to both sides of the ratio. The text
discusses the change in the denominator; critics would also expand the numerator to in-
clude those opportunities that the coaches are willing to support, not merely those
individuals who make the team roster. See, e.g., Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 185, 203
(D.R.I. 1995).
79. See, e.g., Neal 198 F.3d at 767-69; Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir.
1996).
80. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 899 (1st Cir. 1993).
81. Id. at 902 (emphasis added). This "full" requirement is in the Policy Interpretation
but not in the statute or regulation. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; A Pol-
icy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,418 (Dec. 11, 1979).
82. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; A Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed.
Reg. at 71,417; Policy Clarification, supra note 67, at 8.
83. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; A Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed.
Reg. at 71,417; Policy Clarification, supra note 67, at 8.
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groups, such as existing club sports or intramural teams, could
provide information about other student interest and ability.
Student surveys alone, however, are unlikely to support an institu-
tion's decision that women are uninterested in athletic
opportunities because they are poor measures of interest. Moreo-
ver, it is difficult to identify the statistical test or validate the survey
instrument that would be sufficiently precise to measure what the
institutions want to argue: that they meet the same proportion of
814student interest and ability for women that they do for men.
Most problematic is the notion that institutions would have an
accurate picture of women's interest in athletic competition with
these attempts at measuring interest. Research in other areas
strongly suggests that interest is not biologically determined but
rather is learned or cultivated .s In a notorious employment dis-
86
crimination case, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) sued Sears, Roebuck & Company under Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act8 7 alleging that Sears engaged in sex
discrimination in hiring and promotion into commission sales
jobs, reserving these jobs mostly for men while relegating women
to much lower-paying noncommission sales jobs. Although the
EEOC's evidence showed a long-standing pattern of sex segrega-
tion in Sears's sales force, the district court refused to attribute this
pattern to sex discrimination.s The court reasoned that the
EEOC's evidence was based on the "faulty" assumption that female
sales applicants were as "interested" in commission sales jobs as
male applicants.8 9 The court's view of women's lack of interest in
commission sales rested on its conventional images of women as
feminine and nurturing and unsuited for the "rigors" of male-
dominated commission selling.9° Key to the current discussion is
the court's conclusion that Sears was not responsible for its segre-
84. See Brake & Catlin, supra note 47, at 78-82; Shook, supra note 61, at 799-805; John
C. Weistart, Can Gender Equity Find a Place in Commercialized College Sports?, 3 DUKEJ. GENDER
L. & POL'Y 191,232-41 (1996).
85. See JERRY JACOBS, REVOLVING DOORS: SEX SEGREGATION AND WOMEN'S CAREERS
16-20 (1989) (demonstrating that the types of work typically considered "male" or "female"
varies dramatically across different cultures). See generally SEX SEGREGATION IN THE WORK-
PLACE: TRENDS, EXPLANATIONS, REMEDIES (Barbara Reskin ed., 1984).
86. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1278 (N.D. 11. 1986), affd, 839
F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988).
87. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 to -16 (1994) (prohibiting discrimination in employment on
the basis of race, gender, religion, or national origin). The EEOC, the federal administra-
tive agency that interprets Tide VII, is authorized to bring enforcement actions in federal
district courts. Id. § 2000e-5(F) (1).
88. Sears, 628 F. Supp. at 1352-53.
89. Id. at 1305.
90. See id. at 1304-08, 1324-25.
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gated sales force; it merely honored the preexisting preference of
91
women.
In Title VII cases, employers raise the lack of interest argument
to rebut an inference of discrimination based on plaintiffs' statisti-
cal evidence showing women are underrepresented in the
employer's workforce.92 That is, employers acknowledge that
women are underrepresented and argue that they have tried to
attract women, but women remain uninterested primarily because
the so-called "men's jobs" are too demanding. Courts that endorse
this argument by finding the employer not liable "permit and en-
courage employers to continue to organize work and work
relations in ways that disempower women workers from claiming
the more highly valued nontraditional jobs the law has promised
them."93 Observers argue that employers do not simply erect barri-
ers to already formed preferences; they create the workplace
structures and relations out of which those preferences arise.94
Courts in more recent Title IX cases distinguish these earlier
employment cases.95 They understand that women's interest in
sports and intercollegiate athletics is determined, in part, by what
is already available at the relevant institutions. Are there teams? If
so, is there an opportunity for varsity competition? Are these teams
treated as serious endeavors in the same way that men's sports
teams are? Recent decisions have echoed OCR's regulation and
guidelines by placing the burden on institutions to change the ath-
96letic structures and relations out of which preferences arise.
Conversely, if an institution can show good faith efforts to build a
women's athletic program but does not bring its participation rate
91. Id.
92. Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Seg-
regation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argumen4 103 HARV. L.
REv. 1749, 1840 (1990) (indicating that nearly half of the courts accept this argument).
93. Id. I use Sears to describe the lack of interest argument because it has received
widespread media attention. See also Joan Williams, Towards a Reconstructive Feminism: Recon-
structing the Relationship of Market Work and Family Work, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 89, 98-101
(1998) (arguing that a woman's "interest" in certain jobs is heavily influenced by her family
workload).
94. See Schultz, supra note 92, at 1757; Williams, supra note 93, at 89-93.
95. See Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 768-69 (9th Cir. 1999);
Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 176-78 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1186
(1997); Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824,831-32 (10th Cir. 1993); Kelley v.
Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 832 F. Supp. 237, 242 (C.D. Ill. 1993), affd, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir.
1994). But see Pederson v. La. State Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892, 914 (M.D. La. 1996), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 201 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2000) (giving no deference to the proportionality
test "inferred" from language in the Policy Interpretation").
96. See Nea 198 F.3d at 771; Cohen, 101 F.3d at 179-80; Roberts, 998 F.2d at 833-34; Kel-
/ey, 832 F. Supp. at 241. But see Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 914.
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to the level of its undergraduate enrollment, then the lack of in-
terest argument is a defense, as in the earlier employment cases.97
4. Policy Clarification-In 1996, in response to these controver-
sies and continuing pressure from institutions and coaches of male
teams, OCR issued a Policy Clarification on the "three-part test" to
assess an institution's effective accommodation of students' athletic
interests and abilities.98 The Policy Clarification reiterates the Policy
Interpretation's three-part test and its position that an institution
must meet only one part of the test.99 The Policy Clarification gives
specific examples of how an institution might comply under each
prong of the test, especially under the second and third prong. For
example, the clarification specifies certain factors that it will con-
sider as evidence indicating a history of program expansion under
prong two: an institution's record of adding women's teams; an
institution's record of increasing the number of female partici-
pants; and an institution's affirmative response to requests by
students and others to add or upgrade sports.'00 It also emphasizes
that an institution's current practice is very relevant and makes
clear that simply eliminating a women's team is not itself a viola-
tion of Title IX. 10' In addition, the Policy Clarification emphasizes
that cutting or capping men's teams will not help an institution
comply with part two or part three of the test because "these tests
measure an institution's positive ongoing response to the interests
and abilities of the underrepresented sex."' 02
The Policy Clarification also specifies the factors OCR will con-
sider under the third prong in determining whether an institution
has fully and effectively accommodated the interests and abilities
of women students. For example, it makes clear that in determin-
ing whether there is an unmet interest to support an
intercollegiate team, OCR will look at requests by students, thriv-
ing sports teams that are not varsity level, and the results of
97. See Weistart, supra note 84, at 238-40.
98. Policy Clarification, supra note 67. The House of Representatives held hearings on
Title IX in 1995. Hearings on Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Postsecondary Educ., Training and Life-Long Learning of the H.R Comm. on Econ.
and Educ. Opportunities, 104th Cong. (1995). Representatives of football coaches, id. at 200,
220, 385, men's minor sports groups, id. at 78, 101, and two universities found in violation
of Title IX, id. at 78, 101, gave testimony expressing their grievances about Title IX and the
way it was enforced by OCR and the courts. No proposed amendments to Title IX resulted
from the hearings, but some congressmen wrote to OCR to ask that it clarify its three-part
test.
99. Policy Clarification, supra note 67, at 8.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Policy Clarification, supra note 67, at 3 (emphasis added). In contrast, capping or
cutting men's teams can be used to comply with proportionality, the first part of the test.
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surveys. 0 3 It provides similar detail about the factors to examine in
deciding whether sufficient ability exists to sustain an intercolle-
giate team and whether there is a reasonable expectation of
competition for the team. An institution's active encouragement in
the development of the athletic opportunities is key; it makes clear
that when an institution eliminates a viable women's team, the in-
stitution must be able to provide strong evidence that interest,
ability, or competition no longer exists. 04 In general, the Policy
Claification does what it sets out to do-clarify. It disappoints,
however, those who looked to this newest word from OCR as a
chance to reduce the focus on, or even eliminate, the three-part
test to assess institutions' effective accommodation of student ath-
lete interests and abilities.
B. The Cases
This Section analyzes two recent court decisions interpreting Ti-
tle IX as applied to intercollegiate athletics. The first is Cohen v.
Brown University.05 Every circuit court to have reviewed a claim of
discrimination in intercollegiate athletics under Title IX has fol-
lowed Cohen's analysis of the regulation and Policy Interpretation.
0 6
The district court opinion in Pederson v. Louisiana State University,
0 7
analyzed second, provides the rare counterpoint. This discussion
details the arguments of both the proponents and the critics of
Tide IX and illustrates how the Policy Interpretation's three-part test
applies in different situations.
The first of the athletic cases was Cohen v. Brown University.'5
Representing a class of current women athletes, plaintiffs
103. Id. at 10.
104. Id.
105. 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996).
106. Roberts v. Colo. State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507, 1511 (D. Colo. 1993) (discussing
attempt to drop softball and baseball; finding ten percent disparity is too great), affd in part,
rev'd in part by, Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 828-30 (10th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1004 (1993); Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578, 584 (W.D.
Pa. 1993), mot. to modify denied, 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993) (discussing attempt to drop two
men's and two women's sports).
Similarly, courts find no violation of Tide IX when a university drops only men's sports, if
there is a substantial disproportionality. See, e.g., Neal v. Bd of Trs. of Cal. State Univs., 198
F.3d 763, 765 (9th Cir. 1999); Kelley v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 832 F. Supp. 237, 244
(C.D. Ill. 1993), affd, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1128 (1995).
107. 912 F. Supp. 892, 914 (M.D. La. 1996), affd in part, rev'd in part, 201 F.3d 388 (5th
Cir. 2000).
108. 809 F. Supp. 978, 980 (D.R.I. 1992), affd, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993), 879 F.
Supp. 185 (D.R.I. 1995), 101 F.3d 155 (lst Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1186 (1997).
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challenged Brown University's decision to drop two women's
sports. In 1991, Brown announced that as a belt-tightening
measure it would drop four sports from its varsity roster: women's
volleyball and gymnastics as well as men's golf and water polo.'9
Brown cut off the financial subsidies and support services routinely
available to varsity athletes, saving almost $78,000."o Abolishing the
women's teams saved more than $62,000, but did not affect the
overall athletic participation rate for either gender; women
continued to have about thirty-seven percent of the athletic
opportunities and men about sixty-three percent as compared to
Brown's student population of fifty-two percent men and forty-
eight percent women."' Plaintiffs claimed that Brown's athletic
arrangements violated Title IX's ban on gender discrimination.1
2
In reviewing the district court's preliminary injunction, the
court of appeals first held that OCR's Title IX athletic regulation
was entitled to "appreciable deference."" 3 The court noted that the
degree of deference is particularly high "because Congress explic-
itly delegated to the agency the task of prescribing standards for
athletic programs under Title IX."" 4 In addition, the court con-
cluded that the 1979 Policy Interpretation was entitled to
"substantial deference" because it was a "considered interpretation
of the regulation."" 5 The court reviewed the Policy Interpretation,
outlined the three areas of compliance (financial aid, program
benefits, and accommodation of student interests and abilities),
and agreed that an institution could be in violation of Title IX
even if it met the "financial aid" and "program benefits" stan-
dards."
6
Turning its consideration to the contested area of compliance-
effective accommodation of students' athletic interests and abili-
ties-the court repeated the Policy Interpretation's three-part test.
'
1
7
According to the court, the first prong, proportionate participa-
tion rates, provides "a safe harbor for those institutions that have
distributed athletic opportunities in numbers 'substantially pro-
portionate' to the gender composition of their student bodies."0
8
The second prong protects an institution from having to "leap to
109. Id. at 981.
110. Id.
111. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 892.
112. Id. at 893.
113. Id. at 895.
114. Id
115. Id. at 896-97.
116. Id. at897.
117. Id,
118. Id.
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complete gender parity in a single bound""9 as long as it is con-
tinually expanding athletic opportunities for the underrepresented
sex and continues this approach as the interests and ability levels
in its student body rise., Most schools, noted the court, attempt to
comply with Title IX by meeting the third prong of the accommo-
dation test, that is, by satisfying the interests and abilities of the
underrepresented gender. 2' The court emphasized, however, that
the third prong sets a high standard; it demands not merely some
accommodation, but "full and effective" accommodation of
women athletes' interests and abilities. 122
Brown argued that this interpretation of the third prong is in-
consistent with Title IX.123 Brown urged that a more reasonable
reading of the statute allows an institution to meet the third prong
as long as it accommodates the interests and abilities of female
students to the same extent that it meets male students' interests
and abilities.1 2 4 The court of appeals rejected this apparently com-
mon sense reading of the Title IX regulation, reasoning that by
allowing an institution to meet students' interests incompletely,
Brown read the "full" out of the duty to accommodate "fully and
effectively."2 5 The court stated that Brown's alternative interpreta-
tion of Title IX was wrong both as a matter of law and as a matter
of policy. 2 6 Because the agency's interpretation rests on a
"plausible" reading of Title IX, the court is obligated to enforce
it.12 7 The court concluded that the regulation does not conflict with
Title IX and that the three-part test taken as a whole is a reason-
able way to implement the statute. Brown's argument is bad
policy, according to the court, because it would make it more diffi-
cult for institutions to know whether they were in compliance with
Title IX.'2 It would also diminish the responsibility to "take into
account the nationally increasing levels of women's interests and
abilities"'2 0 and aggravate the quantification problems that are
implicit in this proffered reading of the third prong. 131 Finally,
119. Id. at 898.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 899.
124. Id. at 889.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 900.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. (quoting 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,417).
131. Id.
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the court summarily rejected Brown's constitutional challenges
that OCR's reading of the statute violated the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment or that it constituted unlawful
affirmative action. ls
Because the degree of deference to the agency's interpretation
of Title IX was critical to the outcome of the case, Brown Univer-
sity again contested that issue at the subsequent trial in federal
district court. 33 Brown argued that the agency exceeded its rule-
making authority and that the documents were "interpretative"
rather than "legislative" because the rulemaking authority of OCR
was limited to writing rules about "the nature of particular
sports.' 34 Rejecting this argument, the district court noted that the
congressional directive to "include reasonable provisions consider-
ing the nature of particular sports" 13 5 did not limit the scope of the
delegation; it merely compelled the agency to include such provi-
sions in its broader regulatory framework. 36 The defendants next
contended that the Policy Interpretation did not have binding effect
because it was not approved by the President, as the statute re-
quired of the original regulation. 7 The district court rejected this
argument, concluding that the Policy Interpretation was not a
"regulation" as contemplated by the statute, but rather an agency's
interpretation of its own regulations; while not given the force of
law, it was entitled to substantial deference.1 s The court concluded
that the Policy Interpretation was binding unless it was clearly erro-
neous or inconsistent with the statute. 139 Finally, it rejected Brown's
argument that the existence of football excused the lack of pro-
portionality, which, according to Brown, was required by the
government's responsibility to take into account "the nature of
particular sports. "' °
Brown University raised a number of other issues challenging
the premises as well as the substantive provisions of the Policy Inter-
132. Id. at 900-01. Brown University also questioned the district court's allocation of
the burden of proof. Id. at 901. The court of appeals rejected Brown's argument that Title
VII's analytic model of burden setting and shifting should be incorporated into Title IX
litigation. Id.
133. Cohen, 879 F. Supp. 185, 197-98 (D.R.I. 1995).
134. Id. at 198.
135. Id. at 199 (citation omitted).
136. Id.
137. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2000) (stating that "[n]o such rule, regulation, or order shall
become effective unless and until approved by the President").
138. Cohen, 879 F. Supp. at 198.
139. Id. Similarly, the court of appeals rejected the claim that the Policy Interpretation
required impermissible affirmative action. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888,901 (1st Cir.
1993).
140. Cohen, 879 F. Supp. at 199.
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pretation during its second trial in federal district court. First, the
University argued that "substantial proportionality" should be lib-
erally interpreted in favor of institutions because "the gender
composition of the athletic program is both unpredictable and out
of Brown's control." 4' The court rejected this argument, conclud-
ing that "Brown does predetermine the gender balance of its
athletic program through the selection of sports its offers ... , the
size of the teams it maintains .. ., the quality and number of
coaches it hires, and the recruiting and admissions practices it im-
plements."4 Because recruits constitute the bulk of athletes on
nearly all Brown's varsity teams, the court reasoned, the University
should not have been surprised by the gender mix of interested
athletes on campus.143
Second, the University challenged the court's definition of
"participation opportunities," arguing for an expanded defini-
tion. 144 The district court defined "participant opportunities" as
actual participants on intercollegiate teams. '45 In contrast, the Uni-
versity argued that participation opportunity should be measured
by counting each team's filled and unfilled athletic slots. For ex-
ample, Brown argued that participation opportunities should
include the additional athletic slots on women's teams that
coaches testified they were able to support. 14" The court rejected
this argument because Brown "predetermines" the approximate
number of varsity positions available to men and women; thus, ac-
cording to the court, the concept of "unfilled but available"
athletic slots does not comport with reality. 4 7 The court also re-
jected Brown's argument that the number of slots on a women's
team should be the same as the number on the companion men's
team. Declining to adopt what it called a "male model", the court
noted that while sports for men and women may share the same
name, they may not require the same number of team members in
order to compete effectively.
48
Third, Brown recast its "relative interest" argument, raised un-
der the third prong to redefine "participation opportunity", as
crucial to prong one. Brown contended that where the student
141. Id. at 202.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 202.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 203.
147. Id. at 203 n.36. It should be noted, however, that women athletes' behavior does
suggest that women are less interested or willing to be only a bench-sitter so that the likeli-
hood that an institution can meet its squad sizes may differ along gender lines.
148. Cohen, 879 F. Supp. at 204.
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body is composed of equal numbers of men and women, equality
means offering the chance to participate in athletics to an equal
number of men and women. '49 It argued that if students were of-
fered a hypothetical opportunity to participate, the students would
actually participate in varsity athletics in accordance with the rela-
tive interest of their respective genders.1 5 0 "Thus, where the gender
ratio of a university's interested student population is substantially
proportionate to the gender ratio of its athletic program, it may be
assumed that men and women ... were 'offered' an equal
'opportunity' to participate."05' The court rejected Brown's attempt
to shift to the plaintiffs the burden of proving the very proposition
the court of appeals had already dismissed. 52 In this recast form,
plaintiffs would have to undertake the complicated assessment of
"interested" students before comparing that population with the
population of student athletes. Such assessment would "be mean-
ingless since it is an impossible task to quantify latent and
changing interests." 53 After carefully considering various possible
survey pools, the court was unwilling to impose such a heavy bur-
den on the plaintiffs where it was "unclear what population should
be surveyed to assess the interest of the 'qualified applicant pool,'
"'54even if it were possible to do so.
In defining discrimination under Title IX, Brown argued that
the relevant comparison was between the interested potential
varsity athlete pool and the make-up of Brown's athletic program,
rather than the Policy Interpretation's comparison between student
enrollment and varsity athletes. 5 5 The defendant's comparison
borrowed from employment cases under Title VII, where the
Supreme Court has held that the relevant comparison was between
the qualified applicant pool and the workplace demographics,
rather than between the population of the United States and the
workforce.' 56 The district court rejected this analogy, calling the
comparison to Title VII "inapposite." 15 7 According to the court,
Title VII sought to determine whether gender-neutral job
openings have been filled without regard to gender.'58 In contrast,
Title IX was designed to address the reality that sports teams,
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 205 n.41.
153. Id. at 205.
154. Id. at 206.
155. Id. at 206-07.
156. E.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977).
157. Cohen, 879 F. Supp. at 205.
158. Id.
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unlike the vast majority of jobs, had official gender
requirements."9 Thus, Title IX established a legal presumption
that discrimination exists if the university does not provide
participation opportunities to men and women in substantial
proportionality to their respective student enrollments, unless the
university met one of the two exonerating situations set forth in
prongs two or three of the effective accommodation req rement.60
On appeal, Brown University again challenged the applicability
of Title IX on constitutional and statutory grounds, and the court
of appeals again affirmed. 6' Brown continued to press both its
"relative interests" approach and its view that the district court's
decision imposed upon universities the obligation to engage in
preferential treatment by requiring quotas in excess of women's
relative interests and abilities. 62 The court of appeals declined the
university's invitation to undertake plenary review of the issues de-
cided in the previous appeal, but the panel did review the
159. Id.
160. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 211-32. The court also considered whether
Brown was in compliance with Title IX under prong two or three. Cohen, 879 F. Supp. at
211. Because Brown had not maintained a continuing practice of intercollegiate program
expansion for women, the underrepresented sex at Brown, prong two was summarily dis-
missed. Id. Indeed, the percentage of women participating in varsity athletics at Brown had
remained remarkably steady. Id. Under prong three, Brown pressed its original argument
that it could accommodate less than all of the interested and able women, if it accommo-
dated proportionately less than all of the interested and able men. Id. at 208. Brown
introduced a great deal of evidence in support of its position: Brown conducted a survey on
campus, analyzed students' college applications and assembled a variety of national studies
in an attempt to quantify the relative interest of men and women in athletics. Id. at 209-10.
This argument did not persuade the court, however, because Brown still ignored the Policy
Interpretation's directive that an institution determine athletic interests and abilities of its
students in such a way as to take into account the nationally increasing levels of women's
interests and abilities and to avoid disadvantaging members of an underrepresented sex. Id.
at 210. Moreover, Brown's evidentiary attempts showed that no one measure and no identi-
fiable population adequately establish relative interest, thus effectively demonstrating how
Brown's interpretation of prong three would impose an insurmountable task on Title IX
plaintiffs.
Brown also argued that because of the court's interpretation of prong three, institutions
were in effect required to have women athletes in proportion to their representation in the
student body. Id. The court acknowledged that its interpretation of prong three required
that the unmet interests and abilities of the underrepresented sex be accommodated to the
fullest extent until the substantial proportionality of prong one is achieved, but this effect
was short of mandating proportionality in all cases. Id. Brown might be required to achieve
substantial proportionality given the depth of athletic talent at Brown; other universities,
however, might point to the absence of such athletes to justify an athletic program that does
not offer substantial proportionality. Id. Noting that Brown could achieve compliance with
Title IX in a number of ways, the court then left it to Brown's discretion to decide how to
balance its programs in order to provide equal opportunities to its female and male ath-
letes. Id.
161. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1186
(1997).
162. Id. at 174.
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constitutionality of the district court's order requiring Brown to
comply with Title IX by accommodating fully and effectively the
athletic interests and abilities of its female students.'63 Reiterating
the necessity of counting and comparing athletic opportunities
with gender explicitly in mind, the court of appeals held that "the
district court's remedial order passes constitutional muster.""
In contrast to the deference shown by the Cohen courts, the dis-
trict court in Pederson v. Louisiana State University'65 was hostile and
antagonistic to the Title IX regulation and interpretations. Pederson
was also different from Cohen because the plaintiffs were female
students at Louisiana State University (LSU) who had never par-
ticipated in varsity athletics and who wanted LSU to create varsity
athletic opportunities for them.' 66 A Title IX violation is more ob-
vious in cases like Cohen, involving institutions that eliminate
existing varsity teams.167 In those situations there is known interest
and ability to field a competitive team, and the current varsity ath-
letes are obvious plaintiffs. Cases like Pederson, however, more
closely represent those situations that the Policy Interpretation's
three-part test had in mind-an institution's current students with
interest and ability to compete in varsity athletics.
In Pederson, female students at LSU sought a declaratory judg-
ment that LSU violated Title IX by failing to accommodate
plaintiffs' interests and abilities in intercollegiate varsity soccer and
softball. 68 Initially, LSU decided to add softball and women's soc-
cer in the 1995 season but later agreed with the Southeastern
Conference to delay implementation of softball until fall 1996.269
The court found that LSU had not in fact implemented any of
these plans.
1 70
163. Id. at 162.
164. Id. at 184 (applying intermediate scrutiny test). The court did reject the district
court's specific remedy. During the remedy stage the district court substituted its judgment
of how to comply with Title IX for the judgment of the University because the court deter-
mined that the University was not proceeding in good faith. Id. at 185-87. The court of
appeals agreed that the University had not offered its remedy in good faith but reversed the
district court's decision on this point nonetheless. Id. at 188.
ChiefJudge Torruella dissented, essentially accepting the constitutional arguments made
by Brown University. Id. In addition the dissent suggests that because of the specific treat-
ment of contact sports under the Title IX regulation, contact sports should be excluded in
determining participation opportunities. Id. at 192-93. For a recent article supporting the
analysis of the dissent, see Botelho, supra note 43, at 772-95.
165. 912 F. Supp. 892,913-14 (M.D. La. 1996).
166. Id.at911.
167. The 1995 Policy Clarification makes this point explicitly. Policy Clarification, supra
note 67, at 7.
168. 912 F. Supp. at 897.
169. Id. at901.
170. Id.at916-17.
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Plaintiffs asserted a claim for unequal treatment of female ath-
letes, including unequal pay to coaches, lesser quality facilities, and
other related grievances, but the court dismissed the claim because
none of the plaintiffs was a varsity athlete at LSU and thus each
lacked standing to pursue the "equal treatment" claim. 7' The
plaintiffs also asserted a claim for "equal access" or accommoda-
tion, alleging that LSU failed to effectively accommodate plaintiffs'
interests and ability to participate in intercollegiate athletics.
172
Plaintiffs argued that LSU provided greater athletic opportunity to
its male students than its female students at a time when sufficient
interest and ability existed within its female population to justify
increasing women's sports opportunities. 173 The evidence showed
that LSU's student population during the relevant period was fifty-
one percent male and forty-nine percent female, and its athletic
participation for the same period was approximately seventy-one
percent male and twenty-nine percent female.
74
The court concluded that, as to softball, the plaintiffs showed
that sufficient interest and ability existed on the LSU campus to
field a successful Division I women's softball team in 1979. 17 Be-
cause LSU provided greater opportunity to males, specifically that
it provided opportunity to participate in varsity baseball to males,
the court ruled plaintiffs had established sufficient individualized
injury and standing to bring a Title IX action against LSU.
176
In contrast, as to soccer, the district court concluded that the
plaintiffs did not have standing to pursue their claim because there
was no male varsity Division I soccer team at LSU. 77 According to
the court, even though LSU provided greater athletic opportunity to
its male than female students, plaintiffs did not have standing to
challenge the lack of women's soccer because LSU provided the
same opportunity for soccer participation to its male and female
students as a club sport. 78 The court reasoned that LSU's alleged
violation of Title IX-not providing additional athletic opportu-
nity to its female students-did not directly affect these soccer
plaintiffs, because they did not have the talent to participate in any
sport other than soccer at the club level. 79
171. Id. at 902-04.
172. Id. at 904-05.
173. Id. at 905-07.
174. Id. at 915.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 906.
177. Id. at 908.
178. Id. at 907.
179. Id.
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The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed
in part. s° The court affirmed the district court's holding that LSU
violated Title IX by failing to accommodate effectively the interests
and abilities of women students."" The court did not question the
district court's analysis of the substance of the Title IX violation or
chide the lower court for its refusal to defer to the Title IX regula-
tion or its Policy Interpretation. The appellate court, however, did
reverse the district court's decision that the soccer plaintiffs lacked
standing.82
In Pederson, the district court noted the lack of guidance from
the circuit and struggled to find an appropriate analytical frame-
work.183 Noting the regulation and the Policy Clarification, the court
stated that the latter was not signed by the President or endorsed
by Congress and was also "susceptible, in part, to an interpretation
distinctly at odds with the statutory language."8 4 Both parties
agreed that the first prong (proportionality) of the Policy Interpreta-
tion's three-part test, provided a safe harbor. The district court,
however, rejected "most emphatically" this notion of a safe har-
bor.'85 Acknowledging the other judicial decisions that deferred to
the Policy Interpretation and its proportionality test, the Pederson
court said that these decisions were not binding because none
came from the Fifth Circuit.8 6 Additionally, the court found those
decisions unpersuasive because they relied on the erroneous as-
sumption that interest and ability to participate in sports was equal
between all men and women on campus.8 7 Echoing a version of
180. Pederson v. La. State Univ., 201 F.3d 388, 414 (5th Cir. 2000).
181. Id. at 392.
182. Id. at 398. The court of appeals concluded that the soccer plaintiffs did have stand-
ing to bring an effective accommodation claim and ordered the district court on remand to
determine the merits of their claim. Id. at 400.
In addition, the court of appeals vacated the district court's order decertifying a class and
ordered the court to reconsider final class certification in light of the appellate opinion and
all other class certification considerations. Id. at 397.
The court of appeals also reversed the district court's judgment that LSU did not inten-
tionally discriminate against women in the provision of athletics. Id. at 410. The district
court held that the violations were a result of "arrogant ignorance, confusion regarding the
practical requirements of the law, and a remarkably outdated view of women and athletics,"
but not intentional. Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 918. The court of appeals agreed with the
lower court's characterization but concluded that LSU "persisted in a systematic, inten-
tional, differential treatment of women." Pederson, 201 F.3d at 412.
The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision that the plaintiffs lacked stand-
ing to challenge the alleged unequal treatment of varsity athletes at LSU because no named
plaintiff was a member of a varsity team. Id. at 400.
183. Pederson, 201 F.3d at 409.
184. Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 911-12.
185. Id. at913.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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the defendant's argument in Cohen, the district court in Pederson
reasoned that it was more logical to assume that interest in partici-
pation and levels of ability will vary from campus to campus and
region to region as well as over time. 88
In response to other courts' deference to the Title IX regulation
and OCR's interpretations, the district court in Pederson argued
that the proportionality language was only "inferred from language
in the Policy Interpretation and ignore Es] other language within the
Policy Interpretation and the statute which argue [s] against such an
inference. 1 89 The court concluded that the statutory language
mandating that Title IX not be interpreted to require preferential
or disparate treatment to members of one sex 90 prohibited the
numerical proportionality argued for by both defendants and
plaintiffs.' 9' Instead of the Policy Interpretation offering a safe har-
bor, the court found that a proper reading of it allows for
consideration of all factors listed therein to determine whether the
university has provided equal opportunity and levels of competi-
tion for males and females. 92
According to the district court, "the pivotal element of the
analysis in this case [was] the question of effective accommodation
of interests and abilities."' 93 The most important part of this analy-
sis was LSU's knowledge of the interest and abilities of its female
students. Without this information, neither LSU nor the court
could evaluate whether the institution is effectively accommodat-
ing those interests and abilities. Thus, the district court in Pederson
echoed the defendant institution in Cohen, arguing that measuring
interest among current students was crucial to complying with Title
IX. This notion is problematic for the reasons given in Cohen. First,
varsity athletes are typically recruited and are not simply "found" in
the student body. 94 Second, determining interest is extremely dif-
ficult.'95 In contrast to the defendant institution in Cohen, however,
the court in Pederson did not use this interest analysis as a way to
explain LSU's lack of progress or as a way to change the ratio of
188. Id. at 913-14.
189. Id. at 914.
190. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
191. Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 914.
192. The district court in Neal v. Board of Trustees of California State Universities relied on
the Pederson district court opinion to conclude that Title IX's regulation and its Policy In-
terpretation violated the statute in a challenge to a university decision to reduce the spots
on the men's wrestling team. 198 F.3d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 1999). The Ninth Circuit reversed.
Id. at 765.
193. Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 915.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 82-84.
195. See id.
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interested students to varsity athletes. Rather, the court in Pederson
considered the fact that LSU had never attempted to measure stu-
dent interest as evidence that "LSU is and has been ignorant of the
interests and abilities of its student population."' 9
In addition to the court's rejection of the Policy Interpretation's
proportionality rule, the district court decision is interesting for
another reason. In deciding whether LSU effectively accommo-
dated student interests and abilities, the court compared the
treatment of potential female student athletes to the treatment of
male student athletes in the same sport.' 97 For example, the district
court suggested that the soccer plaintiffs could not have succeeded
in showing a violation of Tide IX because LSU did not sponsor a
men's varsity soccer team. 19 In contrast, the softball plaintiffs were
successful in showing a Title IX violation, at least in part because
LSU sponsored a varsity baseball team. 99 Nothing in the regulation
or Policy Interpretation suggests this sport-to-sport comparison. Al-
though commentators to the proposed Policy Interpretation
suggested that equality of opportunity should be measured by a
sport-specific" comparison, the Department's response accom-
panying the final Policy Interpretation noted that there was no
requirement of identical programs for men and women.Y Such a
reading of the statute would overlook two key elements of Title IX
policy. First, a requirement that sports for the members of one sex
be available or developed solely on the basis of their existence for
196. Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 915. This factor is important in determining whether LSU
is in violation of Title IX, but the court's discussion suggests that it is confused about how
the analytical framework set out in the Policy Interpretation fits together. Everyone in the
case agrees that the key question is effective accommodation and the court quotes from the
"overall compliance" section of the Policy Interpretation. Id. at 909. The court rejects, how-
ever, any part of the Policy Interpretation that measures the specifics of effective
accommodation. Id. For other criticism of the court's analysis, see Weistart, supra note 84, at
240 n.168.
LSU could not avoid a finding of noncompliance by relying on other provisions of the
Policy Interpretation. The court specifically held that not only did LSU not have a history
and continuing practice of expanding its women's athletic program, it had a practice not to
expand women's athletics until it became absolutely necessary to do so. Pederson, 912 F.
Supp. at 916. Even though LSU had made a verbal commitment to add two women's sports,
the court found that LSU had so far failed to live up to its commitment. Id. According to the
court, LSU's decision to add two women's sports was not its own; rather it was a Southeast-
ern Conference and National Collegiate Athletic Association decision, one that LSU had
actively lobbied against. Id. at 916-17.
197. Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 915-16.
198. Id. at 907.
199. Id. at 915-16.
200. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; A Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed.
Reg. 71,413, 71,422 (Dec. 11, 1979). Institutions offering the same sports to men and
women would have an obligation to provide equal opportunity within each of these sports.
201. Id.
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members of the other sex would conflict with the nondiscrimina-
tion provision of the regulation where the interests and abilities of
men and women diverge. Second, the regulation frames the gen-
eral compliance obligations in terms of program-wide benefits, not
benefits for specific sports. °2
These two cases, Cohen and Pederson, illustrate opposing views
about Title IX and the 1979 Policy Interpretation in the context of
intercollegiate athletics. The Section has explored the proportion-
ality test relied upon by plaintiffs, the lack of interest argument
advanced by institutions, and the analysis of the federal courts in
specific factual contexts. More importantly, this discussion exposes
the analytical puzzles posed by Title IX and its application to ath-
letics when sex segregated teams are the norm.
II. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The opposing views in Cohen and Pederson illustrate the impor-
tance of the analytical framework used in Title IX athletics cases.
The appropriate analysis to use in these cases is not obvious.
Courts and commentators have urged various analytical models
based upon analogies to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
These suggested analogies are problematic because they ask the
wrong questions, ignore important evidence, exclude considera-
tion of crucial issues, or simply muddy the analysis.
For example, in Cohen v. Brown University, defendant's statistical
expert argued that to assess an institution's effective accommodation
of student athletes' interests and abilities in Title IX cases, the ap-
propriate comparison was between the pool of interested potential
varsity athletes and the make-up of the university's athletic program,
rather than the Policy Interpretation's comparison of undergraduate
enrollment and athletic program participation. 20' The defendant
based its argument for this comparison on an analogy to Title VII204
cases. According to the defendant, the relevant comparison in
202. While the court of appeals reversed the district court with respect to the standing
of the soccer plaintiffs, the court did not indicate disapproval of the lower court's sport-to-
sport comparison. Pederson, 201 F.3d at 409. In fact, in upholding the district court's sub-
stantive decision on Title IX, the court of appeals rejected the University's argument that
reliance on the fact that LSU offers men's baseball as evidence of discrimination was im-
proper. Id.; see also Kelley v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 35 F.3d 265, 271 n.8 (7th Cir. 1994)
(rejecting comparison). But cf. Cook v. Colgate Univ., 802 F. Supp. 737, 742-43 (N.D.N.Y.
1992) (relying on a sport-to-sport comparison).
203. 879 F. Supp. 185, 205 (D.R.I. 1995).
204. Id.
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Title VII cases was between the qualified applicant pool and the
workplace demographics, rather than between the population of
the United States and the workplace demographics. 5
The urge to look to Title VII cases for techniques and analytical
frameworks is understandable. There have been more cases
brought under Title VII than Title IX and while there are clear
differences in the statutes, both seek to end discrimination on the
basis of sex. Moreover, in many Title VII cases, the analytical
framework developed by the courts has meant the difference be-
tween winning and losing, the difference between unmasking
discrimination and failing to see it, or the difference between un-
derstanding the harm and excusing certain conduct. And in some
cases, statistics are indispensable; for example, proof of discrimina-
tion may be inherently statistical because the behavior in question
206
can be observed only in the aggregate.
But the analytical frameworks developed under Title VII make
sense only when they are used to address appropriate questions.
For example, in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,0 7 the Supreme
Court announced an analytical approach to simplify the issues in
an individual disparate treatment case under Title VII. This ap-
proach excludes the most obvious explanations for an adverse
action, for example just cause or being unqualified, and then asks
the employer defendant for some explanation for its action.0 s The
McDonnell Douglas "test" is not useful in other situations, such as
when the qualifications of the employee or applicant are at issue.
Some observers, however, use McDonnell Douglas as a shorthand
expression to describe some kind of "burden-shifting," but they
ignore why and under what circumstances the burden shifts. 209
The discussion in the literature and cases advocating Title VII
analogies is not advanced by several common analytical missteps.
This Part considers three commonly made analogies to Title VII
and demonstrates why they are inapt and ultimately fail to advance
our understanding of the Title IX issues.
205. Id.
206. For further discussion, see Julia Lamber et al., The Relevance of Statistics to Prove Dis-
crimination: A Typology, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 553, 576 (1983).
207. 411 U.S. 792,802-04 (1973).
208. Id. at 802.
209. E.g., Ferrier, supra note 46, at 872-73.
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A. Analogies to Statistical Comparisons
in Hazelwood &Teamsters
The first analogy is the use of Title VII's statistical comparisons
to infer intentional discrimination. For example, in Cohen, the de-
fendant argued that discrimination should be defined by
comparing the gender composition of the "interested potential var-
sity athlete pool ... and the make-up of Brown's athletic
program."1 ° Brown's comparison is borrowed from Hazelwood
School District v. United States, 21 a Title VII case where the Supreme
Court held that the relevant comparison was between the racial
composition of the qualified applicant pool and the employer's
current workforce. In doing so, the Supreme Court rejected a
comparison used in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States,212 where the plaintiff had compared the employer's work-
force with the racial composition of the area's population. The
district court in Cohen rejected the Hazelwood comparison as
"inapposite, 2 3 because Brown's sports teams, unlike the jobs at
issue in the Hazelwood School District, have official gender re-
quirements.
2 1 4
Another fundamental misunderstanding also underlies this
proposed use of the Hazelwood comparison. In Hazelwood, the
plaintiffs challenged the Hazelwood School District's hiring prac-
tices, alleging that African Americans were underrepresented as
teachers in the school district compared to the racial composition
of teachers in the relevant labor market.2 15 Both parties agreed the
"relevant labor market" was the appropriate comparison popula-
tion, but they disputed how to define that group. Plaintiff argued
that the percentage of African American teachers in the school
district should be compared to the percentage of African Ameri-
can teachers in the metropolitan area.1 6 The defendant argued
that the percentage of African American teachers in the school
district should be compared to their percentage in the suburban
area near Hazelwood, specifically excluding the city of St. Louis.1 7
Their disagreement, then, was over the geographic reach of the
210. 879 F. Supp. 185, 205 (D.R.I. 1995).
211. 433 U.S. 299, 310-11 (1977).
212. 431 U.S. 324, 363-64 (1977).
213. Cohen, 879 F. Supp. at 205.
214. Id.
215. Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 301.
216. Id. at 315.
217. Id. at 317.
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relevant labor market rather than over the qualifications of the
group. In contrast, in Teamsters v. United States,1 the U.S. Supreme
Court relied on more general population data to conclude that
African Americans and Hispanics were underrepresented as over-
the-road truck drivers; general population figures were used be-
cause there were no special qualifications for these jobs. In both
cases the comparisons were used to support an inference of inten-
tional discrimination. In Teamsters, the Supreme Court said that
"absent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondis-
criminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work force
more or less representative of the racial and ethnic composition of
the population in the community from which employees are
hired.
,2 19
In a random process, such as jury panel selection, this use of
probability theory is straightforward and unremarkable. One com-
pares the racial composition of the jury panel actually selected with
the racial composition of those eligible. If this comparison shows
that African Americans or Hispanics are underrepresented and the
actual outcome would rarely occur if the process were random,
then the comparison provides persuasive evidence that the process
in fact was not random. Although no one expects employment de-
cisions to be random, we do expect that nondiscriminatory
decisions would generate, over the long run, random results with
respect to race or gender when these characteristics are irrelevant.
Thus, evidence of long-standing and gross disparity between the
composition of a workforce and that of the general population or
labor market can be important because, given the evidence of
availability, the courts are willing to infer that race or gender is the
220basis of the employment decision.
In transposing this analysis to Title IX athletics cases, the defen-
dant in Cohen focused on the difference between general and
specific populations in Teamsters and Hazelwood.22' Accordingly, the
defendant urged the court to adopt Hazelwood's definition of the
"relevant labor market" as the "qualified applicant pool" rather
than Teamsters definition of the "relevant labor market" as the
218. 431 U.S. 324, 340 n.20 (1977).
219. Id.
220. Julia Lamber, Discretionary Decisionmaking: The Application of Title VII's Disparate Im-
pact Theory, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv 869, 897.
221. See generally Connolly & Adelman, supra note 66, at 849 (describing "how the inter-
collegiate athletic provisions of Title IX are being applied and how universities can comply
with the law in a way that will be least harmful to their athletics programs");Jeffrey Orleans,
An End to the Odyssey: Equal Athletic Opportunities for Women, 3 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y
131, 142-45 (1996) (reviewing case law determining Title IX requirements).
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area's population.22 According to the defendant's view, the
"qualified applicant pool" in Title IX athletic cases is the narrower,
"more qualified," "interested potential varsity athlete pool" as op-
posed to the more general "population in the community",
undergraduate enrollment. 2 3 Hazelwood and Teamsters are not,
however, in conflict, even though the Supreme Court used differ-
ent comparison populations. The Court approved the different
comparisons because of differences in the jobs at issue and the
likelihood that qualifications are distributed throughout the popu-
lation. In both cases, the claim was based on comparing a proxy
for the "expected outcome," where the employer is likely to hire
from, with the employer's current workforce. In Hazelwood, the
relevant labor market could have been defined nationally or in
terms of those with teacher certification. In Teamsters, the relevant
labor market could have been defined in terms of those possessing
a valid driver's license.
The question in Title IX athletic cases is: what is a useful proxy
for the applicant pool or "expected outcome" in intercollegiate
athletics? Defendants' suggestion of "skilled and interested stu-
dents" is one possibility, but Hazelwood does not limit the relevant
labor market or qualified applicant pool to actual applicants or to
those looking for jobs. In Title VII cases, the courts have aban-
doned the call for plaintiffs to produce data on actual applicants
when they present their Hazelwood or Teamsters disparate treatment
claim, in part, because of the difficulty of identifying "actual appli-
cants" and the likelihood that those who feel they would not be
treated fairly would be unlikely to apply.2 4 Employers remain free
to produce actual applicant data to rebut the inference of inten-
tional discrimination created by the plaintiffs' comparisons.
Similarly, in Title IX athletics cases, "actual applicants" or
"skilled and interested students" would be difficult to identify and
to quantify for the same reason that it is difficult to measure the
relative interests of student athletes. Courts have correctly noted
that this interest is not unaffected by past discrimination and cur-
rent intercollegiate athletic offerings. For example, the court in
Cohen considered but rejected several possible populations as part
of its discussion about whether plaintiffs bear the burden of identi-
fying groups in terms of their "relative interests." 22 The narrower
222. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 185,205-06 (D.R.I. 1995).
223. Id.
224. Courts have abandoned the call for actual applicants despite Justice White's plea
to require the data. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 347-49 (1976) (WhiteJ, concur-
ring in No. 76-255 and dissenting in No. 76-422).
225. Cohen, 879 F. Supp. at 206-07.
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definitions-"skilled and interested students" or high school ath-
letes where "strictly voluntary" participation reflects "true
interests"-are based on the assumption that men are inherently
more interested in athletic participation, and any comparison that
does not reflect this difference is wrong. In Title VII cases, the
courts have also been cautious about using proxies for applicant
pools that are or may be tainted . 6
Finally, even if we could agree on another proxy for the
"expected outcome" to compare with the make-up of the institu-
tion's athletic program, reliance on the Hazelwood/ Teamsters
inference is misplaced. The Supreme Court relied on the probabil-
ity theory in Teamsters and Hazelwood because of its view that
nondiscriminatory employment decisions should generate, over
the long run, random results with respect to race or gender when
those characteristics are irrelevant.27 That is, in Teamsters and Ha-
zelwood, courts could infer race was relevant to the hiring decisions
because there was such a disparity between the expected outcome
and the actual outcome. This same inference is not relevant to Ti-
tle IX athletic cases where the issue is whether the institution has
effectively accommodated the interests and abilities of both sexes.
Such an inference might be relevant if institutions had decided to
field unisex or coed varsity teams. In most Title IX cases raising the
issue of "effective accommodation," however, the institution has
made gender relevant because they define teams by gender.
28
There is no need for a statistical inference to see if gender is rele-
vant to the selection; the use of gender is overt and clear.
Several commentators take the Hazelwood argument even fur-
ther. They argue that "[m]andating substantial proportionality
without a showing of discrimination, as compelled by Hazelwood,
violates the Equal Protection Clause."2 9 According to this argu-
226. For example, in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, the Court re-
jected an employer's argument that a person who has not already applied for ajob with the
defendant can never be awarded seniority relief: "A consistently enforced discriminatory
policy can surely deter job applications from those who are aware of it and are unwilling to
subject themselves to the humiliation of explicit and certain rejection." 431 U.S. 324, 365
(1977); see also Lamber et al., supra note 206, at 585-87; Elaine Shoben, Probing the Discrimi-
natory Effects of Employment Selection Procedures with Disparate Impact Analysis Under Title VII, 56
TEX. L. REV. 1 (1977).
227. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 340 n.20.
228. E.g., 2000-01 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL at 3.2.1.4 (2000) (defining separately the
required number of male and female teams), http://www.ucaa.org/library/membership/
division_i..manual/article_3.pdf (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform).
229. Charles P. Beveridge, Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics: When Schools Cut Men's Ath-
letic Teams, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 809, 835; see also Connolly & Adelman, supra note 66, at
862-63,870-71.
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ment, courts have turned Title IX into an "affirmative action" stat-
ute, contrary to the intention of Congress and the Constitution.
2 30
This view, however, misunderstands the nature of the claim made
in a case analogous to Hazelwood. The claim in Hazelwood is that the
school district intentionally discriminated against African Ameri-
cans in the hiring of teachers. 23' Evidence that African Americans
were underrepresented in the workforce, compared with their
availability in the relevant labor market, raised the inference that
race somehow matters in the hiring process. The defendant school
district remained free to try to rebut this inference by showing, for
example, that their recent hires were more representative of the
applicant pool. The remedy sought in cases like Hazelwood is usu-
ally adding some structure to the hiring process, some "affirmative
action" advertising efforts, and the like. Rejecting this analogy to
Hazelwood, the court in Cohen concluded that the lack of propor-
tionality was itself evidence of discrimination in violation of Title
Thus, it would be a mistake to incorporate the Hazel-
wood/Teamsters analysis into Title IX athletics cases. Hazelwood and
Teamsters ask different questions and are based on different factual
situations than the ones raised by recent Title IX athletics cases.
But more importantly, the Hazelwood and Teamsters cases are useful
in exposing otherwise covert discrimination. The Title IX claims
here raise issues of equality in a sex segregated system.
B. Analogies to McDonnell Douglas
Before the Supreme Court adopted the analytical framework
in Hazelwood and Teamsters, it developed its Title VII analysis for
claims of individual disparate treatment. In McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 3 the Court adopted a three step process for cases
of individual discrimination where there was no direct proof of
intentional discrimination. In their search to find the appropriate
analytical framework for Title IX cases, courts have erroneously
adopted the McDonnell Douglas model.
230. Connolly & Adelman, supra note 66, at 871.
231. See supra text accompanying notes 215-17.
232. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 185, 207 (D.R.I. 1995); see also Weistart, supra
note 84, at 232 n.143 ("To suggest that women who win under Title IX are the beneficiary
[sic] of 'affirmative action' or a 'quota' treats the basic claim of discrimination as somehow
unjust or unfair. As typically used in the sports context, such a phrase is largely a veiled
argument for continuing the historic status quo of substantial male preferences.").
233. 411 U.S. 792, 792-93 (1973).
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For example, in Cook v. Colgate University,2 34 plaintiffs challenged
Colgate's decision to maintain women's ice hockey as a club sport
as a violation of Title IX. For more than ten years, women student
players had asked Colgate to elevate the sport to varsity status, but
Colgate's Committee on Athletics turned them down four times.
211
Each time the committee reasoned that 1) ice hockey was rarely
played on the secondary level; 2) championships were not spon-
sored by the NCAA; 3) the game was played at only fifteen colleges
in the east; and 4) hockey was expensive to fund, which would
heavily impact the total intercollegiate program. 36 Colgate main-
tained that Title IX prohibits discrimination only in an athletic
program considered as a whole and that plaintiffs' challenge was
simply over its decision to maintain the club status of women's ice
hockey. 7 Colgate also argued that it is improper to compare a
women's club team with a men's varsity team.238
The court noted that the Title IX standard provided that
"'equivalent benefit and opportunities must be provided' ... to
men and women,"2 9 and in determining whether such athletic op-
portunities are available to men and women, courts should
consider "whether the selection of sports and levels of competition
effectively accommodates the interests and abilities of members of
both sexes."2 In making this determination, the court found that
"there is little guidance for the method to use in concluding
whether there is a violation of Title IX,"24' apparently ignoring the
detailed Policy Interpretation of 1979.
At the urging of both parties, the court adopted the three step
process for determining gender discrimination used in Title VII242
cases. "This appears to be an appropriate approach," reasoned
the court, "in view of the fact that there is no direct proof of inten-
tional discrimination by Colgate."43 Under the Title VII analysis of
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,2" once the plaintiff succeeds in
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, then the burden
shifts to the defendant to come forward with evidence of some le-
gitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct. If the defendant
234. 802 F. Supp. 737, 739 (N.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated as moot, 992 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993).
235. Id. at 740.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 742.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 743 (citation omitted).
240. Id. (citation omitted).
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. 411 U.S. 792,802 (1973).
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establishes legitimate reasons for its decisions, then the plaintiff, in
order to prevail, must show that the reasons advanced by the de-
fendant are a pretext for discrimination. 45
The court in Cook recast this three step process for Title IX. To
establish a prima facie case, the plaintiffs must demonstrate 1) that
the athletic department is subject to the provisions of Title IX; 2)
that they are entitled to the protection of Title IX; and 3) that they
have not been provided "equal athletic opportunities. ", 46 If plain-
tiffs prove a prima facie case, they will have established a
rebuttable presumption that Colgate violated Title IX.24 7 This pre-
sumption disappears if Colgate comes forward with legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons for its decision not to upgrade the
women's hockey team to varsity status.48 Once Colgate has intro-
duced such evidence, in order to prevail, the plaintiffs must prove
that Colgate's proffered reasons are merely a pretext.24 9 The court
noted that steps one and two were not contested, so the critical
factor is the third, that is, whether Colgate has provided them with
equal athletic opportunities.
Relying on the list of factors in the Title IX regulation to deter-
mine whether equal athletic opportunity is available, plaintiffs
showed differences between men and women's ice hockey at Col-
gate in six categories: expenditures, equipment, locker room
facilities, travel, practice times, and coaching, thereby establishing
25
a prima facie case. 51 Colgate responded by saying the reason for
these differences is that, at Colgate, men's ice hockey is a varsity
sport and women's ice hockey is a club sport. Colgate then gave
the same four reasons for its refusal to elevate the club sport to a
varsity team as well as two additional ones: lack of student interest
and lack of ability. The court rejected all of the reasons except
cost, concluding that the other five reasons for Colgate's decision
were "factors which are not going to change to any significant de-
gree in the near future."2 5 2 "Therefore, the court can only
conclude that all of the above reasons are not legitimate reasons
to deny equality, but must be considered a pretext for discrimi-
nation in violation of Title IX."2 5 3 Finally, the court rejected cost
as ajustification for gender discrimination and ordered Colgate to
245. Id. at 804.
246. 802 F. Supp. 737, 743 (N.D.N.Y. 1992).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 743-44.
250. Id. at 744.
251. Id. at 744-45.
252. Id. at 749.
253. Id.
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grant varsity status to women's ice hockey the following academic
254year.
Whether Colgate provided women and men equal athletic op-
portunities is the correct issue, but the court's analysis of that issue
is not advanced by its use of the McDonnell Douglas framework,
which is merely a more cumbersome way of asking the same ques-
tion. In contrast, the original four factors in McDonnell Douglas,
while not difficult to meet, were intended to narrow and focus the
factual inquiry. The plaintiff in McDonnell Douglas established a
prima facie case of intentional racial discrimination in hiring by
showing that 1) he belonged to a racial minority; 2) he applied
and was qualified for ajob for which the employer was seeking ap-
plicants; 3) despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and 4) after
his rejection, the position remained opened, and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons with qualifications simi-
lar to the plaintiffs. 25  These questions were reasonable in light of
the facts in McDonnell Douglas because the applicant had once
worked successfully as a mechanic for the employer and the em-
ployer was looking for mechanics a few months after the plaintiff
had been laid off.256 The four factors listed by the Court establish a
prima facie case by eliminating the most common or obvious rea-
sons for an employer not to hire someone. That is, if the applicant
possessed the necessary qualifications and there was ajob opening,
race is a "reasonable" explanation for what happened. This infer-
ence is not at issue in cases like Cook because the difference in
treatment on the basis of sex is apparent. The real issue in Cook is
whether the differences represent unequal athletic opportunity or
whether the differences in athletic opportunity can be justified.
By using the McDonnell Douglas three-part framework, the court
in Cook not only failed to sharpen the factual inquiry, but it also
actually made the issues more confusing. If the plaintiffs' claim is
whether Colgate provided women and men equal athletic
opportunities, then the court's modified McDonnell Douglas
standard, which asks plaintiffs to prove that they have not been
provided "equal athletic opportunities" as part of their prima facie
case, makes no sense. It mixes the ultimate question with the
preliminary ones in a prima facie case. The problem with the Cook
court's analytical standard, however, is more than merely
confusing conclusions with analysis because of the effect this
confusion has on the defendant's obligation. Under McDonnell
254. Id. at 750-51.
255. 411 U.S. 792,802 (1973).
256. Id. at 794.
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Douglas, the plaintiffs' prima facie case creates a presumption that
the defendant can then rebut with a fairly minimal burden of
production of evidence, namely that the plaintiff was rejected for a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. Subsequent cases tell us that
the proffered reason does not need to be a very good reason or
indeed even the actual reason for the decision.257 In contrast, if the
ultimate Title IX issue is whether Colgate provided women or men
equal athletic opportunities, then once the plaintiff produces
persuasive evidence on this issue, the burden of proof shifts to the
defendant to justify this difference in treatment. On this issue, the
defendant has a tough burden of proof, that is to satisfy the court
that there is a very good reason for this gender difference.
In Cook, plaintiffs viewed the differences between men and
women's ice hockey at Colgate to be a result of Colgate's failure to
provide equivalent athletic benefit and opportunities to men and
women. 25 Alternatively, they believed these differences illustrated
that the selection of sports and levels of competition did not effec-
tively accommodate the interests and abilities of members of both259
sexes. Understood in these terms, the plaintiffs' claim seeks to
challenge the kinds of sports offered at the varsity level at Colgate,
the number of women and men participating, as well as the funds
2W0that supported these programs.
A more complete analysis of how ice hockey fits with the other
offerings at the varsity level is needed. The Policy Interpretation,
which the court did not discuss, states that "[i]n the selection of
sports, the regulation does not require the institutions to ...
257. See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993) (stating that
whether a defendant has met has burden of production does not involve a credibility as-
sessment); Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981) (stating that
"[tihe defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the prof-
fered reasons" to satisfy its burden of production).
258. 802 F. Supp. 737, 745 (N.D.N.Y. 1992).
259. Id. at 750.
260. The court indicated that the budgetary allocations between men and women's
sports was considerably unequal. Specifically, the court stated that:
If football is excluded, then there are eleven varsity sports for each gender. Making a
comparison of the eleven varsity sports for each gender in 1990-91, shows a budget
for men's varsity sports of $380,861.00, and for women's varsity sports of
$218,970.00.... With football included.... the total budget for men's varsity sports
was $654,909.00.
Id. at 742. The court goes on to explain in a footnote that "[t]his does not include Coach
Supported Financial Aid (tuition, room, board, and jobs) which is much greater for men."
Id. at 742 n2.
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provide exactly the same choice of sports to men and women."261 It
goes on to say, however, that where an institution does sponsor a
team in a contact sport for members of one sex, as Colgate does with
men's ice hockey, it may be required to sponsor a separate team for
the previously excluded sex.262 This is the case if the opportunities
for the excluded sex have historically been limited, there is
sufficient interest and ability among the members of the excluded
sex to sustain a viable team, and there is a reasonable expectation
of intercollegiate competition for that team.263 Thus, the factors
raised by Colgate in defense of the Title IX claim are far from
"pretextual;" under the Policy Interpretation, they are the very issues
the court should consider.
Although the Policy Interpretation does not favor the sport-to-
sport comparison used by the court in Cook, such a comparison
might properly be part of the larger claim of unequal athletic
benefits. The Policy Interpretation states that "neither the statute nor
the regulation calls for identical programs for male and female
athletes. Absent such a requirement, the Department cannot base
noncompliance upon a failure to provide arbitrarily identical pro-
grams, either in whole or in part. " 6 In addition, the sport-specific
concept overlooks two key elements of the Title IX regulation.
First, the regulation states that the selection of sports should be
representative of student interest.265 A requirement that a sport be
available (at the same level with the same support) solely on the
basis of its existence for members of the other sex could be a prob-
lem when men's and women's interests diverge. Second, as
Colgate urged in its original argument, the regulation frames
compliance in terms of program-wide benefits.26 Thus, the reason
not to make women's ice hockey a varsity sport at Colgate may be
that there is more interest among the women in crew, volleyball,
or gymnastics, or that the athletics department has decided to in-
crease its support for existing women's sports. Conversely, the
reason not to make it a varsity sport may be the University's stereo-
typical ideas about women and "appropriate" sports offerings for
them. Without more information on Colgate's athletic program as
a whole, it was difficult for the court to evaluate the university's
decisions. The court's use of the McDonald Douglas analytical
261. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; A Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed.
Reg. 71,413, 71,417-18 (Dec. 11, 1979).
262. Id. at 71,418.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 71,422 (emphasis added).
265. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1) (1999).
266. See id.
[VOL. 34:1&2
Gender and Intercollegiate Athletics
framework, however, leads it to ask the wrong questions, to focus
on the wrong evidence, and ultimately to decide the wrong issues.
C. Analogies to Disparate Treatment and Disparate Impact
Other commentators view Tide IX intercollegiate athletic cases
as developing a hybrid disparate treatment-disparate impact the-1 .. . . 267
ory of discrimination. Under this hybrid, Tide IX athletics
plaintiffs need not prove discriminatory intent; facially sex-neutral
actions may be the basis of Title IX noncompliance.26 At the same
time, proof of disparate impact alone does not establish a Tide IX
violation; plaintiffs "must accompany statistical evidence of dispa-
rate impact with some further evidence of discrimination, such as
unmet need"269 among the underrepresented sex.
In Roberts v. Colorado State University, students and former
members of the University's softball team brought suit against
Colorado State University (CSU) and its governing board,
Colorado State Board of Agriculture, after CSU announced that it
was discontinuing the varsity softball program. With this
termination, the disparity between undergraduate enrollment and
athletic participation for women at CSU was 10.5%.27' The
defendant argued that a 10.5% disparity met the Policy
Interpretation's safe harbor of "substantial proportionality.,
272
Rejecting the defendants' position and finding a violation of Title
IX, the district court issued a permanent injunction requiring the
defendant to hire a coach, recruit new members for the team, and
organize a fall season.273 The court of appeals upheld the district
court's decision and concluded that the lower court had not erred
in failing to require proof of discriminatory intent. 74 In
reallocating the burden of proof, however, the court of appeals
held that
267. See, e.g., Philip Anderson, A Football School's Guide to Title IX Compliance, 2 SPORTS L.
J. 75,88 (1995).
268. Id.
269. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 895 (lst Cir. 1993).
270. 814 F. Supp. 1507, 1510 (D. Colo. 1993), affd sub nom. Roberts v. Colo. State Bd.
of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1004 (1993).
271. Id. at 1512.
272. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 829.
273. Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1509.
274. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 832-33.
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[b] ecause a Title IX violation may not be predicated solely on a
disparity between the gender composition of an institution's
athletic program and the gender composition of its
undergraduate enrollment, ... plaintiff must not only show
that the institution fails on the first benchmark of substantial
proportionality but also that it does not fully and effectively
accommodate the interests and abilities of its women
athletes.275
Commentators view this case as depicting Title IX's equality
model as "a sort of disparate impact-plus standard"2 76 derived by
analogy to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Developed under Title VII, the disparate treatment theory of
discrimination involves allegations of intentional discrimination;
plaintiffs assert that considerations of race, gender, or the like in-
fluence an adverse employment decision. Proof of impermissible
motive is crucial, but a court may infer this motive from differ-
ences in treatment.277 In contrast, disparate impact claims involve
allegations of "unintentional" discrimination.27 s Plaintiffs challenge
facially benign employment policies that fall more harshly on mi-
nority group members or women than on others. Proof of
impermissible motive is not essential, but the defendant may avoid
liability by proving that the challenged employment policy is cen-
tral to its legitimate business interests.279 In their traditional and
classic forms, these two analytical frameworks serve different pur-
poses and seek to effectuate two different theoretical conceptions
of equality.
Under Title IX and its applicable regulation, a plaintiff may also
make either a disparate treatment or a disparate impact claim. As
with other analogies to Title VII, one needs to be mindful of the
evidence and its purpose in particular cases for the analogy to be
useful. Each decision of the U.S. Supreme Court approving the
disparate impact theory under Title VII illustrates the analytical
framework in its classic form. Each case involved a challenge to a
clearly identified, objective employment policy that was applied at
a determinative point in the employment process and related
causally to the observed adverse impact on minority group mem-
bers or women. For example, plaintiffs argued the effect of a
height and weight requirement excluded a disproportionate num-
275. Id. at 831.
276. Anderson, supra note 267, at 88.
277. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
278. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
279. Id. at 431.
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ber of women and was not justified; 280 plaintiffs showed that the
failure to have a high school diploma had an adverse impact on
African Americans; 28' and plaintiffs proved that discriminatory em-
ployment tests were unrelated to the employment in question.282 In
each instance, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant em-
ployer to show that the rule, requirement, or test is job-related.
Under Title IX, one would expect a disparate impact claim if
plaintiffs wanted to challenge a facially neutral requirement, such
as prior membership on a varsity team in order to be a member of
a certain social fraternity. On the other hand, one would expect a
disparate treatment claim if plaintiffs wanted to challenge a prior-
ity system that allowed football players to register for classes before
anyone else.
Claims like the one in Robert283 do not fit nealy into either
theoretical framework. As a result, adopting those frameworks
may lead the courts and litigants to focus on the inappropriate
questions. For example, in Roberts, the court acknowledged the
aptness of the analogy to Title VII in some Title IX cases but
went on to state that, in that case, Title IX and its implementing
regulations (including the Policy Interpretation) offered enough
guidance in setting the burden of proof and application of the
Title VII model was unnecessary.284 The plaintiffs challenged the
elimination of softball as a varsity sport on grounds that, by defi-
nition, softball was a women's sport, and thus, its elimination was not
sex-neutral.285 Such gender specific actions do not necessarily violate
Title IX's Policy Interpretation, however. The question was whether an
institution such as CSU provides "equal athletic opportunity" for
members of both sexes, considering, among other factors, whether
the selection of sports and levels of competition effectively accom-
modated the interests and abilities of members of both sexes. The
Policy Interpretation further expands this inquiry by suggesting that if
women do not participate proportionately in athletics, an institution
may be in violation of Title IX, if evidence shows that there is not a
program of current expansion or that there is unmet athletic inter-
est and ability.286 Hence, the court of appeals in Roberts required that
"plaintiff must not only show that the institution fails on the first
benchmark of substantial proportionality but also that it does not
280. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 323-24 (1977).
281. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 425-26 (1971).
282. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,436 (1975).
283. See supra notes 269-70 and accompanying text.
284. Roberts v. Colo. State Univ., 998 F.2d 824, 833 n.14 (10th Cir. 1993).
285. Id. at 830.
286. See id. at 829.
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fully and effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of its
women athletes."287 This conclusion was not an illustration of a dis-
parate impact/disparate treatment hybrid model. Rather, it was
the answer to a different set of questions posed specifically by the
Policy Interpretation.
Looking to analytical frameworks developed under Title VII is
understandable. While still controversial itself, Title VII law is
familiar to civil rights litigants and to the courts. Analogies are
problematic, however, when they ask the wrong questions, ignore
important evidence, exclude consideration of crucial issues, or
simply muddy an analysis. The court in Roberts did the right thing
to ignore the Title VII model; other courts and litigants should
be as thoughtful.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
The major difference between the questions that arise in Title
IX athletics cases and those that arise in the employment arena
under Tide VII is that most intercollegiate athletics teams are
defined by gender. The current prevalence of separate teams for
men and women, however, has not been uncontroversial. Origi-
nally, there was much litigation over whether all-male teams were
required to allow qualified females to try out and play for the
team, from Little League to college football teams.2 8 The consti-
tutional dimensions of the issue are unclear. The U.S. Supreme
Court has never decided whether gender-based "separate but
equal" teams in athletics is constitutionally permissible; nor has it
decided the constitutionality of an alternative scheme, that is,
unisex teams open to men and women but where women do not
289
succeed on the same basis as men.
This Part reviews the Supreme Court decisions on gender dis-
crimination, including its most recent decision in United States v.
287. Id. at 831.
288. E.g., Brenden v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 742, 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973); Hoover v.
Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. 164 (D. Colo. 1977); Carnes v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic
Ass'n, 415 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Tenn. 1976); Thomas F. Quinn, Case Comment, Gomes v. R.I.
Interscholastic League, 469F. Supp. 659 (D.RI. 1981), 14 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1471, 1478-79
(1980); see also Karen L. Tokarz, Separate But Unequal Educational Sports Programs: The Need for
a New Theory of Equality, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 201, 212-17 (1985) (analyzing challenges
to the separate but equal doctrine in educational sports programs by female and male
plaintiffs respectively).
289. See infra text accompanying notes 309-26.
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Virginia.2° It concludes that Tide IX's Policy Interpretation is a use-
ful description of a constitutional separate-but-equal athletic
program, especially if differences between women and men
sports are valid, rather than based on overbroad generalizations
about women's talents, capabilities, or preferences.
In 1971, the U.S. Supreme Court first held unconstitutional a
state law classifying people on the basis of gender. In Reed v.
Reed,2 1 the Court struck down an Idaho statute requiring that
among "several persons claiming and equally entitled to adminis-
ter [a decedent's estate] males must be preferred to females."2 92
While gender-based classifications have never been analyzed with
the same degree of rigor or suspicion as racial ones, since Reed,
courts have "carefully inspected official action that closes a door
or denies an opportunity to women (or to men) ." 93 Typically, a
state must show that the challenged classification bears a substan-
tial relationship to important governmental objectives.294 The
justification must be genuine, and it must not rely on overbroad
generalizations about the different talents, capabilities, and pref-
erences of men and women. 5 According to Chief Justice
Rehnquist, the principle underlying the decisions in the Su-
preme Court's recent gender discrimination cases is that the
legislature may not make overbroad generalizations based on sex
that are entirely unrelated to any differences between men and
women or that demean the ability or social status of the affected
class. 96
The Supreme Court has found some gender-based classifica-
tions permissible, however. In Califano v. Webster,27 the Court
upheld a congressional statute that provided higher social secu-
rity benefits for women than for men, reasoning that "women...
as such have been unfairly hindered from earning as much as
men."2 s Similarly, in Rostker v. Goldberg,29 the Court upheld a fed-
eral law requiring men but not women to register for the. draft
because the purpose of the registration was to prepare for a draft
290. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
291. 404 U.S. 71, 73 (1971).
292. Id.
293. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532.
294. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
295. Reed, 404 U.S. at 76.
296. Michael M. v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981) (citing
Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 354 (1979) (plurality opinion of Stewart,J.)).
297. 430 U.S. 313, 318 (1977).
298. Id.
299. 453 U.S. 57,77 (1981).
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of combat troops, and women were not eligible for combat.300 In
California Federal Savings & Loan v. Guerra,3"' the Court upheld a
state law that granted some women but not men a leave of absence
and job reinstatement because it promoted equal employment op-
portunity. "2
The Supreme Court has also upheld statutes where the gender
classification is not invidious, but rather reflects the fact that men
and women are not "similarly situated" in certain circumstances.
For example, in Michael M. v. Sonoma County,303 a seventeen-year-
old boy sought to set aside the criminal complaint of statutory
rape, asserting that the statute unlawfully discriminated on the ba-
sis of gender as males alone were criminally responsible under the
statute. The California Supreme Court had upheld the statute,
finding that the state had a compelling interest in preventing
teenage pregnancies and that because males alone can
"physiologically cause the result which the law properly seeks to
avoid," °4 the gender classification was justified as a means of iden-
tifying offender and victim. 305 The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed,
primarily because of its view that men and women "are not simi-
larly situated with respect to the problems and the risks of sexual
intercourse " 306 or pregnancy and because the statute was realisti-
cally related to the legitimate state purpose of reducing those
problems and risks. 30 7 The Court noted that since only females are
subject to a risk of pregnancy, a criminal sanction imposed solely
on males serves to roughly equalize the deterrent effects on both
308
sexes.
In the most recent equal protection challenge, the Supreme
Court was faced with the claim that sex-segregated educational
programs were equal and therefore constitutional. The Supreme
Court, however, struck down Virginia's attempt to exclude
women from the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) and held that
its attempt to provide equivalent training and education at a pri-
vate women's college was inadequate. 310 The United States sued
Virginia and VMI, Virginia's only single-sex public institution of
300. Id.
301. 479 U.S. 272, 289 (1987).
302. Id
303. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
304. Michael M. v. Sonoma County, 601 P.2d 572, 575 (1979).
305. Id.
306. Michael.M., 450 U.S. at 471.
307. Id. at 472-73.
308. Id. at 473.
309. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
310. Id. at 520.
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higher education, alleging that VMI's exclusively male admission
policy violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.31' Virginia asserted two justifications. First, single sex
education provides important educational benefits, and the option
of single sex education contributes to the diversity in educational'l 312
approaches. Second, the school's adversarial approach, the
unique method of character development and leadership training,
would have to be modified if women were admitted to VMI.
313
The Court rejected Virginia's arguments, noting that while di-
versity may be an acceptable goal, Virginia had not shown that VMI
was established or maintained with a view toward diversifying edu-
cational opportunities within the state, especially because the only
single-sex opportunity was available exclusively to men.1 4 Accord-
ing to the Court,
[a] purpose genuinely to advance an array of educational op-
tions ... is not served by VMI's historic and constant plan-a
plan to "affor[d] a unique educational benefit only to males."
However, "liberally" this plan serves the Commonwealth's
sons, it makes no provision whatever for her daughters. That
315is not equal protection .
The Court also rejected Virginia's argument that VMI's adversa-
tive method of training provides educational benefits that cannot
be made available, unmodified, to women.36 The United States did
not challenge expert witness estimations of the average capabilities
or preferences of men and women. Instead, it emphasized the
need to take a "hard look" at the generalizations and "tendencies"
pressed by Virginia.3 The Court rejected the notion that admis-
sion of women would downgrade VMI's stature and destroy the
adversative system.3 8 Noting that most women would not choose
VMI's adversative method, the Court said the question was
"whether the Commonwealth can constitutionally deny to women
who have the will and capacity, the training and attendant oppor-
tunities that VMI uniquely affords."
3 1 9
311. Id. at 523.
312. Id. at 535.
313. Id. at 540.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 539-40.
316. Id. at 546.
317. Id. at541.
318. Id. at542.
319. Id.
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Finally, the Court turned to the question of whether Virginia's
alternate program, Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership
(VWIL), was sufficient to allow VMI to continue as a male-only col-
lege. The court of appeals had concluded that it did, deciding that
the two single-sex programs directly served Virginia's purposes of
single gender education while achieving the results of an adversa-
tive method in a military environment.3 2 0 Inspecting the two
programs to determine whether they afforded to men and women
benefits comparable in substance if not in form and detail, the
court concluded that they did sufficiently to survive an equal pro-
tection challenge.3 2 ' Reversing, the Supreme Court found that the
alternate program was not sufficiently like the program at VMI to
qualify as VMI's equalY. The VWIL's student body, faculty, course
offerings and facilities do not match VMI's.12 3 Nor could the VWIL
graduates anticipate the same benefits associated with VMI's his-
tory, school prestige, and its influential alumni network.2  The
Court concluded that while the program at VWIL might be valu-
able to those who seek that program, the remedy offered no cure
for the opportunities and advantages withheld from women who
wanted a VMI education. In short, Virginia was offering separate
but not equal programs.326
In applying these constitutional lessons to the question of gen-
der discrimination in intercollegiate athletics, schools could
integrate their men's teams, declaring that membership on all ath-
letic teams will be determined by skill. It is probable that some
women, but not many, would make the various squads. The Title
IX Policy Interpretation contemplates that when a school has a single-
sex team based on ability, the institution may have a duty to offer
another single-sex team for women if their opportunities have
been underrepresented in the past.32 7 The Policy Interpretation and
an early department memorandum clearly take the position that
opening teams to members of both sexes is not sufficient. 8 Under
320. United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229, 1239 (4th Cir. 1995).
321. Id. at 1240-41.
322. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 515.
323. Id. at 557.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 555.
326. Id. For a further discussion of United States v. Virginia, see Cass R. Sunstein, Fore-
word: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REv. 4, 72-79 (1996); Deborah A. Widiss, Re-
Viewing History: The Use of the Past as Negative Precedent in United States v. Virginia, 108 YALE
L.J. 237 (1998).
327. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; A Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed.
Reg. 71,413, 71,418 (Dec. 11, 1979).
328. See Thomas A. Cox, Intercollegiate Athletics and Title IX, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 34, 48
(1977) (citing to Policy Interpretation and Office for Civil Rights, Dept. of Health, Educ. &
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this view, expansion of women's athletic opportunities is a sepa-
rate, distinct goal of Tide IX. In a 1975 memorandum providing
guidance to schools concerning their first year responsibilities in
complying with the athletics provisions of the regulations, OCR
wrote: "[A]n institution would not be effectively accommodating
the interests and abilities of women if it abolished all its women's
teams and opened up its men's teams to women, but only a few
women were able to qualify for the men's teams."32 The Supreme
Court, however, has not decided the constitutional ramifications of
programs that treat women and men exactly alike when one sex
does not succeed as well as the other.5 °
Alternatively, schools could provide separate but equal athletic
programs for men and women, but we do not have many examples
of what equality looks like under such schemes. 31' Ensuring equal-
ity in terms of scholarships and other program components, such
as recruitment, equipment, travel, and practice times, is one part.
Schools would need to compare the availability, quality, and kinds
of benefits, opportunities, and treatment afforded men and
women athletes. Differences such as rules of play, rate of injury, or
nature of facilities required would not necessarily make the sepa-
rate programs "unequal." The Policy Interpretation, for example,
provides that as long as the institution meets the sports specific
needs of both men and women, "differences in particular program
components will be found to be justifiable."03 2 What is difficult to
know in advance is how many teams or female participants an insti-
tution should have in order to "desegregate" an all-male program
5333or avoid an "identifiable" male athletic program.
Welfare, Memorandum on Elimination of Sex Discrimination in Athletic Programs (Sept.
1975), available atwww.ed.gov/offices/OCR/docs/holmes.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2001)).
329. Id. at 48 n.87.
330. VMI did not raise this issue in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). What if,
for example, VMI had said that it would admit women but make absolutely no changes in its
program? The Court was not faced with this question, because all parties conceded that the
admission of women would require some changes to the adversative methods. Id. at 540-41.
Thus, in terms of Title IX and intercollegiate athletics, we do not know whether the Consti-
tution would require institutions simply to open up previously all-male teams, make changes
in the rules of football or other contact sports so that women could participate, or permit
separate teams for men and women.
331. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Bd. of Educ., 449 U.S. 1301 (1980) (holding that in a contact
sport such as basketball, where a school district maintains separate girls and boys programs
and devotes equal time, money, personnel, and facilities to each, there is a strong probabil-
ity that the gender-based classification can be justified).
332. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; A Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed.
Reg. at 71,416.
333. An analogy can be made to school desegregation remedy cases under the Four-
teenth Amendment. See, e.g., N.C. State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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The Policy Interpretation's three-part test is one answer to this
question. Determining whether an institution has effectively ac-
commodated the interests and abilities of men and women athletes
is not simply an easy-to-administer enforcement policy; rather, it
also makes sense. There are "enough" teams or participants if the
number of women athletes is roughly the same as the number of
women undergraduates. This comparison provides a proxy for what
the expected outcome would be if athletic opportunities had been
offered to both sexes or offered on a non-sex-segregated basis. Like
jury selections, absent discrimination, one could expect that the
number of men and women participating in varsity athletics would
mirror the number of men and women available in the student
body.
The reality of intercollegiate athletics is, however, different; one
cannot reasonably expect all athletic programs to mirror the popu-
lations of the institutions' undergraduate population. What would
an alternative goal be, if we are looking for a separate but equal
program? Given that women have been historically excluded from
athletic opportunities or offered them at an entirely different level,
it makes sense that a separate but equal program would take time
to develop or mature. Thus, the second prong of the Policy Interpre-
tation states that an institution is protected if it can show "a history
and continuing practice of program expansion which is demon-
strably responsive to the developing interest and abilities of the
members of that sex."334 In other words, the institution does not
need to have an "equal" men's and women's program in an instant
(or even in five or ten years). Moreover, under prong three, an
institution can show that it has tried to offer an athletic program
for women that is equal to that offered to men but that women are
not interested, capable, or able to compete. Thus, if prong three
were applicable to United States v. Virginia, it would provide VMI
with a defense if VMI accepted and recruited women, but few who
applied succeeded. Thus, the Policy Interpretation can serve as a use-
ful description for what separate but equal in intercollegiate
athletics might look like constitutionally.
336
The decision in United States v. Virginia suggests that separate but
equal athletic programs would be upheld only if the differences
between men and women are real rather than based on overbroad
334. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; A Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed.
Reg. at 71,418.
335. Id.
336. The dissent in Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996), offers a different
reading of United States v. Virginia and the constitutional questions. See discussion supra note
164.
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generalizations about the talents, capacities, or preferences of
males and females. The Court reiterated that gender classifications
"may not be used ... to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and
economic inferiority of women.0 37 Thus, the final question is
whether by offering separate athletic programs institutions are
recognizing real differences between men and women or whether
they are perpetuating stereotypes that women cannot, or should
not, compete with men. Stereotypes would seem to explain much
of the treatment (or non-treatment) of women in sports in the first
part of the twentieth century. The common perception of women
as delicate, private, and passive, as well as societal beliefs about ap-
propriate activities for women, severely limited women's
participation in sports. Women were considered too weak and
fragile for competitive sports; of special concern were the effects of
such sports on women's reproductive functions.
In the 1970s, the same social pressures that brought women to
corporate board rooms and courtrooms began to break down arti-
ficial barriers to women's participation in athletics. Originally,
women argued for the opportunity to participate on men's teams,
in part perhaps because women's teams, as we know them, did not
exist. 339 During this time, women's college athletic programs were
affiliated with and administered by the departments of physical
education. 340 Budgets were limited and facilities were lacking. 4' In
one case challenging a school district's policy of maintaining both
boys' and girls' basketball teams, the female plaintiff argued that
the programs were not equal because participation with "girls of
substantially lesser skill was not as valuable as competition with
persons of equal or better skills in the boys' program."3 2
337. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996) (citing Goesaert v. Cleary, 335
U.S. 464, 467 (1948)).
338. Wendy Olson, Beyond Title IX: Toward an Agenda for Women and Sports in the 1990's,
3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 105, 109 (1991); see also RtrrH M. SPARHAWK ET AL., AMERICAN
WOMEN IN SPORT, 1887-1987: A 100-YEAR CHRONOLOGY, at xiii (1989) (introducing a
chronology of female sports achievement with recognition that, in the nineteenth century,
"accepted patterns of behavior for women reflected frailty, ill health, and weakness"); U.S.
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, PUB. No. 63, MoRE HURDLES TO CLEAR: WOMEN AND GIRLS IN
COMPETITIVE ATHLETICS 1-3 (1980) (discussing traditional stereotypes that served as barri-
ers to female participation in sports).
339. Cf Olson, supra note 338, at 115 (discussing equal protection litigation that sought
to secure female positions on all-male teams).
340. Seeid. at 110-11.
341. See Jennifer Henderson, Gender Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics: A Commitment to
Fairness, 5 SETON HALLJ. SPORT L. 133, 144-45 (1995).
342. O'Connor v. Bd. of Educ., 645 F.2d 578, 579 (7th Cir. 1981). For the argument
that separate teams violate the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee, see
generally Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggrega-
tion of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1995); Karen Tokarz, Separate But Unequal
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Nevertheless, since the 1980s, the major thrust of gender equity
in athletics has been to create, expand, and support separate ath-
letic opportunities for women. Today, rather than argue that
women can compete on men's teams, most of the focus is on the
differences between men's and women's sports. For example, in
Cohen v. Brown University3 the court rejected the suggestion that
the size of men's teams should set the standard for women's teams.
The court pointed out that, even though they may share the same
name, men's and women's teams have different rules of substitu-
tion, contact amount, size of field, and number of specialized
positions that can affect appropriate team size. 3" According to an
expert witness, softball and baseball are two completely different
sports with baseball having a larger team primarily because of the
differences in pitching in the two sports.35 This focus on the dif-
ferences between men's and women's sports avoids the question of
whether women are inherently slower, weaker, and smaller than
men. While in absolute terms these biological differences are true
today, this "real difference" argument assumes that current forms
of athletic competition, which are male-based in origin and devel-
opment, must be continued.3 6
Difficult constitutional questions about gender, Title IX, and in-
tercollegiate athletics remain unanswered. In the end these
questions turn on the social construction of athletic heroes. It is
important for all of us to know that women, as well as men, can be
athletic heroes. The next Section discusses some of the ways insti-
tutions have chosen to develop their athletic programs to meet the
demands of the Constitution and Title IX and to provide female
athletes with opportunities to become celebrated in sports.
IV. THE DATA
This Part presents an empirical study, looking first at gender
equity plans written by institutions of higher education for the Na-
tional Collegiate Athletic Association and then at data from more
than 325 institutions, pursuant to the Equity in Athletics Disclosure
Educational Sports Programs: The Need for a New Theory of Equality, I BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ.
201 (1985).
343. 879 F. Supp. 185, 204 (D.R.I. 1995).
344 Id. at 204 n.39.
345. Id.
346. Snow& Thro, supra note 44, at 40 n.141; see also Farrell supra note 63, at 1015-20.
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Act.347 The gender equity plans provide narrative information
about how institutions plan to come into compliance with Title IX.
They are not advocacy documents but rather strategic planning
documents. They are useful to see different ways institutions plan
to tackle the gender equity issues on their campuses. In contrast,
information disclosed pursuant to the Equity in Athletics Disclo-
sure Act is quantitative data that provides answers to basic Title IX
inquires: What is the enrollment at the institution? How do the
numbers of athletes compare with that enrollment? What is the
proportion of the recruitment or aid budget that goes to women
athletes? What are the revenues and expenses for men and women
sports?
This information suggests that the four myths surrounding dis-
cussions of Title IX and intercollegiate athletics should be
rejected.3 48 First, successful football programs and Title IX compli-
ance are not inconsistent. While critics have often sought to
protect football from Title IX compliance efforts, the data shows
schools with football programs do comply with Title IX.3 49 In fact,
football may make it easier to have successful women's athletic
programs. Second, opponents of Title IX claim that men's teams
have been eliminated to pay for women's teams. 50 While there is
often public relations rhetoric to support this claim, the data sub-
mitted by higher education institutions demonstrate otherwise.
Third, opponents of Title IX claim that football and men's basket-
ball should be exempt from the requirements of Title IX because
they financially assist women's sports.35 1 Football and men's basket-
ball produce positive net revenues at some schools, but they do not
produce positive net revenues at smaller schools or at the big-time
athletic programs that do not sponsor football. 352 Even if all schools
produced positive net revenues, it is difficult to understand why
this factor would lead to exempting those men's sports. Fourth,
men's teams need not suffer in order to enhance women's teams,
nor must intercollegiate athletics be enhanced at the expense of
academics. The data suggests that, at least at many institutions, ath-
letic budgets are not declining and thus can accommodate many
Title IX goals.
347. 20 U.S.C. § 1092(g) (2000). All data and plans are on file with the author.
348. See supra text accompanying notes 5-7.
349. See infra text accompanying notes 388-93, 398-400.
350. SeeWeistart, supra note 84.
351. Compare Ferrier, supra note 46, at 871-72, with Farrell, supra note 63, at 1028-36.
352. See infra text accompanying notes 402-05.
353. See infra text accompanying notes 396-404.
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A. NCAA Certification and Gender Equity Plans
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) initially
worked to limit the reach of Title IX in intercollegiate athletics by
urging that revenue producing sports be exempt from the Title IX
regulation. 4 The NCAA then challenged the regulation in federal
court, arguing that the Office for Civil Rights had exceeded its
regulatory authority by issuing the regulation. 3 Nevertheless, in
1981, the NCAA created women's championships in nine sports
and at three division levels.356
In 1991, at the request of the National Association of Collegiate
Women Athletic Administrators, the NCAA surveyed its members
about expenditures for women's and men's athletic programs.3 57 In
1992, the NCAA established a gender equity task force and
charged it with defining gender equity, examining NCAA policies
to evaluate their impact on gender equity, and recommending a
strategy to measure and realize gender equity in intercollegiate
athletics. 35 8 The task force adopted the following definition of gen-
der equity: "[G]ender equity in intercollegiate athletics describes
an environment in which fair and equitable distribution of overall
athletics opportunities, benefits and resources is available to women
and men and in which student-athletes, coaches and athletics admin-
istrators are not subject to gender-based discrimination. 3 59 The task
force also supported the Committee on Athletics Certification rec-
ommendation that included gender equity as an element of
certification.
In 1993, the NCAA began an "athletics certification" process for
Division I schools.3 6' The process is meant to ensure that Division I
institutions comply with the operating principles and bylaws of the
354. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs and Activities Re-
ceiving or Benefiting from Federal Financial Assistance, 40 Fed. Reg. 24,128, 24,134 (1975)
(reporting NCAA's opposition during the drafting and the comment periods for the Title
IX regulation).
355. NCAAv. Califano, 444 F. Supp. 425,429 (D. Kan. 1978), rev'd, 622 F.2d 1382 (10th
Cir. 1980).
356. Ass'n for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women v. NCAA, 558 F. Supp. 487, 492
(D.D.C. 1983).
357. NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC AS'N, FINAL REPORT OF THE NCAA GENDER-
EQUITY TASK FORCE 1 (1993) [hereinafter NCAA GENDER-EQUITY TASK FORCE] (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
358. Id.
359. Id. at 2.
360. Id. at 8.
361. NCAA DIVISION I ATHLETICS CERTIFICATION HANDBOOK 3 (2000), http://
www.ncaa.org/databases/selfstudy/athletics-cert.program.html (on file with the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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NCAA in four areas: governance and rules compliance; academic
integrity; fiscal integrity; and commitment to equity.36 2 The NCAA's
commitment to equity requires institutions to "demonstrate that it
is committed to, and has progressed toward, fair and equitable
treatment of both male and female student-athletes and athletics
department personnel."1
6 3
Similar to accreditation reviews of educational institutions, the
certification process begins with an institutional self-study that in-
cludes a written plan for addressing gender equity in the
intercollegiate athletics program at the institution . 3 1 In the fall of
1998, I wrote to nearly 200 Division I schools asking for the gender
equity plan they had written as part of this NCAA certification
365process. These plans provided an idea of how schools planned to
comply with Title IX. Schools are not required to make their plans
public, and only fifty schools complied with my request.
366
The NCAA did not prescribe a format for these plans, and the
fifty plans examined ranged from simple one page documents to
several that were more than thirty pages long. Some plans only dis-
cuss programmatic changes, such as changing which teams are
entitled to training tables, and other schools focus only on the
number of student athletes. Most plans, however, have both an
analysis of the participation rates for the last three or five years and
a discussion of the various programmatic changes or institutional
adjustments. In addition to those changes that speak directly to
equalizing specific programmatic benefits or resources, several
schools have adopted policies that address the "perception of ine-
quality." For example, plans call for the adoption of written policies
for teams to address the misconception that an informal policy has
gender bias; plans require training of coaches on the issues of sex-
ual harassment and the university's procedures for dealing with
362. Id.
363. NCAA ATHLETICS CERTIFICATION SELF-STUDY INSTRUMENT § 4.1 (2000), http://
www.ncaa.org/databases/selfstudy/athletics-cert-program.html (on file with the University
of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
364. Id. Plans must include measurable goals the institution intends to achieve, steps
the institution will take to achieve those goals, persons responsible and timetables.
365. Division I schools have the largest athletic programs. The NCAA divides Division I
into three parts: Division I-A has the largest football programs, Division I-AA has slightly
smaller football programs, and Division I-AAA has no intercollegiate football programs.
Schools in Division I-AA are not in my sample and are excluded from this study.
366. In order to encourage as many schools as possible to send their plans, I promised
anonymity. Several schools gave reasons why they did not send their plans. One frequent
reason cited was that they were "currently undergoing certification process" or "the gender
equity plan is unavailable due to a change in administration." The most common reason
received for an institution not sending its plan was a decision to keep it confidential. The
majority of schools, however, did not answer the request at all.
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sexual harassment claims; and other plans suggest developing for-
mal schedules to address women's concerns about access to
programs, for instance strength and conditioning schedules. Given
the limited number of replies and the differences in plan formats,
I did not attempt a quantitative analysis. Still, the plans are useful
as illustrations and examples of institutions' approaches to compli-
ance with the requirements of Title IX.
There are two obvious ways to comply with Title IX's propor-
tionality requirement. Institutions may supplement women's
athletic programs so that the number of participants and the
money spent are similar to the number of participants and money
spent on men's athletic programs, or they may reduce the number
367of participants and money spent on men's athletic programs. Be-
cause of the costs associated with increasing women's
opportunities, the second option--cutting men's sports-at first
seemed more likely. The worry was that institutions would elimi-
nate men's nonrevenue sports or make serious cuts in football
squads. The gender equity plans studied overwhelmingly took the
expansion track. Only four institutions mention specifically that
they planned to eliminate a men's sport, and none mentioned cuts
in football. Another stated that men's wresting and gymnastics
were discontinued in 1980 and 1985, respectively, "to enhance the
women's program" but there is no evidence of the subsequent
"enhancement" as such in their women's program or of a more
favorable male/female participation ratio.
Most plans adopt the same general strategies of compliance: add
women's sports, cap men's teams, and fully fund existing sports.
Based on these plans, soccer and softball were the women's sports
most commonly added in the early 1990s, or in plans to be added
in 1998 or 1999. The gold medal success of the U.S. soccer and
softball teams reflect the growing interests in these sports. Rowing,
or crew, is the next most common sport to be added; its advantage
is that large numbers can participate without extensive previous
experience, helping to reduce the male/female participation ratio.
Lacrosse is the other sport mentioned by more than just a few
schools.68
Capping men's teams, or "roster management," was one of the
initial strategies for Title IX compliance, but, according to these
plans, it originally met with little success, especially with baseball
and track teams. Some schools specifically say roster management
is to control particular sports, but none of these mention football,
367. See supra Part IIA.2.
368. See infra text accompanying notes 407-08.
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the sport with the largest teams. In fact, none of the plans mention
the size of their football team except in general discussion or when
listing all sports provided at the institution. Roster management
has also been adopted as a strategy for increasing women's partici-
pation. One school has an aggressive walk-on program for women
in order to increase its female participation ratio from within ten
percent to within five percent of its female undergraduate enroll-
ment without adding a sport. Another school plans to reach parity
in its participation rates by increasing the size of its women's track
team from 50 to 120 women over four years, while leaving men's
track at fewer than 50 participants. It has no concrete plans to
make this expansion occur other than a policy to encourage the
coaches to field "full" squads.
Most of these schools fully fund each sport to the maximum
number of scholarships allowed by the NCAA. If an institution
does not, however, the gender equity plan addresses the issue.
Typically, there will be a plan to phase in scholarships, especially if
the school is adding a new team. The big question here is whether
the additional scholarships will be funded with new money or
through internal reallocation. Most plans raise the issue but do not
settle it.
Most of these gender equity plans systematically review the fac-
tors listed in the Title IX regulation, and reiterated by the Policy
Interpretation, to determine whether equal athletic opportunity is
available in a particular program. In many cases, the institutions
find that they are in compliance or that observed differences are
not based on gender, but rather, reflect differences in sports, an
exception contemplated by the regulation and Policy Interpretation.
Other plans set out a timetable by which the institution will up-
grade the existing women's sports program, for example,
upgrading the women's sports offices or the women's locker rooms
or standardizing travel and per diem allowances. Still other plans
are "plans to comply," for example, to make sure travel dollars are
equivalent or that marketing efforts are similar, but the tone is "we
aren't doing this now, though we will." In addition to upgrading
parts of their programs, some schools take the opportunity to
eliminate benefits now offered only to men to avoid having to ex-
tend them to women's teams. One school canceled the country club
membership for the football coach; another eliminated its training
table. In addition, most schools have eliminated separate administra-
tive structures for men's and women's athletic programs. Under
such a move, one university assigned a male staff member to travel
with some women's teams and a female staff member to travel with
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some men's teams. In this way, the department was able to uncover
and correct subtle or unconscious differences between the treat-
ment of men's and women's teams.
Nearly all of the gender equity plans measured their compliance
with whether they have effectively accommodated the interests and
abilities of male and female students under the first prong of the
Policy Interpretation-substantial participation rates. Some institu-
tions also depend on their ability to show that they have history
and continuing practice of program expansion which is responsive
to the interests and abilities of women. No school asserts that it has
tried to expand the athletic opportunities for women athletes but
has been unable to find interested and skilled women athletes.
Only one school asserts that it is currently in compliance with Title
IX because it has effectively accommodated the interests of
women, although the plan is silent on how it accomplished this.
Not surprisingly, each plan illustrates that the institution under-
stands the requirements of Title IX compliance. It is also not
surprising, however, that most plans reflect an optimism about the
school's ability to reach predicted participation rates. An examina-
tion of those rates, as well as other information gleaned from the
institutions' Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act36 9 forms, follows.
B. Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act: Information and Analysis
In 1994, Congress enacted the Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act
(EADA) .37 This statute requires all coeducational institutions of
higher education that participate in any federal student financial
assistance aid program, and have intercollegiate athletic programs,
to provide specific information on their athletic programs.3 71 All
institutions must prepare and make available annual reports on
participation rates, scholarships, and other financial information
on men's and women's intercollegiate athletic programs.3 72 The
legislation helps students and the public get information about an
institution's compliance with Title IX and, by making the informa-
tion available to the public, pressures schools to comply with the
369. 20 U.S.C. § 1092(g) (2000).
370. Id
371. Id.
372. Id.
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law.373 Neither the legislation nor the implementing regulations374
prescribe a particular form for the report; nor did they originally
specify where institutions should make their reports.75
In 1996, the NCAA decided to combine the requirements of the
EADA and its own gender equity survey into one form and pro-
vided its member institutions with a suggested format in which to
report the data. 76 Five years earlier, the NCAA had surveyed its
members' expenditures for women's and men's athletics pro-377
grams. The study was not designed to measure Title IX
compliance, but the data did allow for comparison between men's
and women's programs. According to the NCAA Gender-Equity
Task Force, the analysis was disturbing: "undergraduate enroll-
ment was roughly evenly divided by sex, but men constituted 69.5
percent of the participants in intercollegiate athletics and their
programs received approximately 70 percent of the athletics schol-
arship funds, 77 percent of operating budgets, and 83 percent of
recruiting money. ",3 s The Gender-Equity Task Force, established in
1992 recommended the NCAA repeat the gender-equity survey
every five years.3 79 The NCAA, however, releases this data only in
aggregate form.38°
In order to get information on specific schools, in the fall of
1998, I requested Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act (EADA) in-
formation from more than 400 NCAA member schools. The EADA
requires schools to provide a listing of the varsity teams, the num-
ber of participants, the total operating expenses, the amount of
athletically-related student aid, and the revenue and expenses gen-
erated by men's and women's programs as well as information
about coaches and their salaries.8s
I was particularly interested in information about football teams
and how the existence of a football program affected an institution's
373. See Sudha Setty, Leveling the Playing Field: Reforming the Office for Civil Rights to Achieve
Better Title IX Enforcement, 32 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 331, 348-49 (1999) (suggesting that
publishing Title IX reports would facilitate progress towards gender equity).
374. 34 C.F.R. § 668.48 (1999).
375. A 1998 amendment, Pub. L. No. 105-244 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 10 9 2 (g)( 4 )), re-
quires institutions to submit their EADA report to the Secretary of Education; the Secretary
must prepare a report to Congress by April 1, 2000 to be made available to the public.
376. NCAA GENDER EQUITY-STUDY: SUMMARY OF RESULTS 2 (April 1997) [hereinafter
NCAA GENDER-STUDY] (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
377. NCAA GENDER-EQuITY TASK FORCE, supra note 357, at 1.
378. Id.
379. NCAA GENDER-EQuITY TASK FORCE, supra note 357, at 6. For an interesting ac-
count of the working of the NCAA task force, see James Whalen, Gender Equity or Title IX, 5
KAN.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 65 (1996).
380. See NCAA GENDER-STUDY, supra note 376, at 3.
381. 20 U.S.C. § 1092 (2000).
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Title IX compliance, so I requested EADA information from Divi-
sion I-A schools (110 schools with big-time football and basketball
programs), Division I-AAA schools (79 schools with big-time bas-
ketball and no intercollegiate football program), and 215 Division
III schools with football and basketball programs. I received 246
responses with usable information: for Division I-A, 89 schools; for
Division I-AAA, 50 schools; and for Division III, 107 schools.8 2 The
data collection was repeated in Fall 1999; to keep the same com-
parisons, I asked the same 404 institutions for their EADA
information. I received 329 responses with usable information: for
Division I-A, 92 schools; for Division I-AAA, 65 schools; and for Di-
vision III, 172 schools.
TABLE 1
GENDER EQUITY SURVEY RESULTS
2000 Data: Collected by Lamber
NCAA Undergrad Numbers of Recruiting
Division Enrollment Athletes Difference Aid($) Expenses
I-A (n=92)
women 51% 42% -9 39% 30%
men 49% 58% +9 61% 70%
I-AAA
(n=65)
women 57% 48% -9 52% 43%
men 43% 52% +9 48% 57%
III (n=172)-H1
women 52% 38% -14 na 0%
men 48% 62% +14 na 70%
382. The overall response rate in 1998-99 was 61%. Within each category, the response
rate was as follows: 81% for Division I-A; 63% for Division I-AAA; and 50% for Division III.
Division I-A schools are overwhelmingly public institutions (82%); Division I-AAA schools
are mixed (56% public); and Division III schools are overwhelmingly private (16% public).
The data published by the NCAA in its first gender equity study is from the academic year
1990-91. It was published in March 1992 and is referred to as 1992 data. Similarly, the
NCAA's second gender equity study was based on information from the 1995-96 school
year, was published in April 1997, and is referred to as 1997 data. For consistency, my data
from the 1997-98 school year will be referred to as 1999 data.
The NCAA data on Division III includes all Division III schools whereas my 1999 data in-
cludes only Division III schools that sponsor intercollegiate football. The football group is
about two-thirds of the total membership of Division III.
383. I excluded those responses with the wrong year or incomplete information. The
overall response rate in 1999-2000 was 81%. Within each category, the response rate was as
follows: 91% for Division I-A; 82% for Division I-AAA, and 80% for Division III. The pub-
lic/private split is mirrored in this sample (Division I-A 84% public, Division I-AAA 52%
public, and Division III 16% public).
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TABLE 1 (CONTINUED)
1999 Data: Collected by Lamber
NCAA Undergrad Numbers of Recruiting
Division Enrollment Athletes Difference Aid(S) Expenses
I-A (n=89)
women 51% 39% -12 38% 28%
men 49% 61% +12 62% 72%
I-AAA
(n=50)
women 57% 47% -10 52% 40%
men 43% 53% +10 48% 60%
III (n=107)
women 52% 39% -13 na 29%
men 48% 61% +13 na 71%
1992 Data: Collected by NCAA
NCAA Undergrad Numbers of Recruiting
Division Enrollment Athletes Difference Aid ($) Expenses
I-A (n=98)
women 49% 29% -20 28% 16%
men 51% 71% +20 72% 84%
I-AAA(n--83)
women 53% 36% -17 42% 25%
men 47% 64% +17 58% 75%
Ill (n=227)
women uk 35% uk na uk
men uk 65% uk na uk
% calculated on the basis of numerical means.
uk = unknown
na = not available
The results show gradual improvement. According to the data
for the 1997-98 school year, women constituted almost 52% of the
undergraduate enrollment, but men constituted 60% of the par-
ticipantsM4  in intercollegiate athletics, and men's programs
384. "Participants" include all students who practice with the varsity team and receive
coaching as of the day of the first scheduled intercollegiate contest of the designated re-
porting year, including junior varsity team and freshman team players if they are part of the
overall varsity program. The Secretary believes that a reasonable count of participants would
also cover all students who receive athletically-related student aid, including redshirts, in-
jured student athletes, and fifth year team members who have already received a bachelor's
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received approximately 66% of the athletic scholarship funds 5
and 57% of the recruiting budget38t As one might expect, there
are differences among the NCAA divisions. In Division I-A schools,
women were slightly more than half of the undergraduate enroll-
ment (51%), while men constituted 61% of the participants in
intercollegiate athletics and received 62% of the athletic scholar-
ship funds and 72% of the recruiting budget. In Division I-AAA,
women constituted 57% of the undergraduate enrollment, and
men were 53% of the athletic participants and received 48% of the
athletic aid and 60% of the recruiting budget. In Division III,
women were 52% of the undergraduate enrollment, and men con-
stituted 61% of the athletic participants and received 71% of the
recruiting budget3 7 For the 1998-99 school year, women contin-
ued to constitute more than half of the undergraduate enrollment
(52.5%), and men constituted 58% of the athletes, with their pro-
grams receiving approximately 55% of the athletic scholarships
and 65% of the recruiting budget.
The 1999 data shows non-football schools (Division I-AAA) do
the best in terms of proportionality, substantiating the claim of Ti-
tle IX opponents that gender equity defined in terms of
proportionality is difficult as long as football participants are
counted in the mix. This difference disappears in the 2000 data,
however, at least with regard to Division I schools. One might also
argue that schools with large football programs would have even
more difficulty complying with Title IX than Division III schools,
where the teams are smaller and the costs of the sport are less.
To the contrary, this data shows that Division III schools fare
degree. Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act, 60 Fed. Reg. 61,424, 61,434 (Nov. 29, 1995) (to
be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt 668).
385. "Athletically-related student aid means any scholarship, grant, or other form of finan-
cial assistance, the terms of which require the recipient to participate in a program of
intercollegiate athletics at an institution of higher education in order to be eligible to re-
ceive that assistance." 34 c.F.R. § 668.48(b) (1) (1999).
386. "Recruiting expenses means all expenses institutions incur for recruiting activities,
including but not limited to expenditures for transportation, lodging, and meals for both
recruits and institutional personnel engaged in recruiting, all expenditures for on-site visits,
and all other expenses related to recruiting." Id. § 668.48(b) (3).
The "operating" expense information from the EADA forms was not computed because
so many forms had incomplete information in this section. Information from the table on
revenue and expenses was computed.
387. Division III schools do not award athletic-related aid.
388. According to the 2000 data, the average size of a Division I-A football team is 117
participants; the minimum number is 90 and the maximum number is 205. The average
size of a Division III football team is 85 participants; the minimum is 26 and the maximum
is 181. According to the 1997 NCAA data, the average operating expenses for Division I-A
football was $1,451,300 and for Division III football, $57,300. NCAA GENDER-EQuITY
STUDY, supra note 376, at 25, 93.
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worse, on average, in terms of proportionality than Division I-A
schools.
This summary data, however, mask individual differences. To
determine if there were differences among NCAA divisions in
compliance with Title IX, I constructed a "participation compli-
ance" measure. 3 9 While Title IX does not specify what constitutes
"substantial proportionality," some out-of-court settlements suggest
women's athletic participation within 5% of their undergraduate
enrollment is an appropriate definition.390
TABLE 2
PARTICIPATION COMPLIANCE
1999 DATA
1997-98 SCHOOL YEAR
AT 5% LEVEL AT 3% LEVEL
DIVISION I-A 14/89 = 16% 8/89 = 9%
DIVISION I-AAA 11/50 = 22% 4/50 = 8%
DIVISION III 9/107 = 8% 5/107 = 5%
2000 DATA
1998-99 SCHOOL YEAR
AT 5% LEVEL AT 3% LEVEL
DIVISION I-A 23/92 = 25% 15/92 = 16%
DIVISION I-AAA 14/65 = 22% 9/65 = 14%
DIVISION I1 19/172 = 11% 8/172 = 5%
Thirty-four of the 246 schools in my sample would pass this 5%
proportionality test: 14/89 (16%) Division I-A schools; 11/50
(22%) Division I-AAA schools; and 9/107 (8%) Division III
schools. I also constructed a more stringent compliance measure,
asking how many schools would be in compliance if women's ath-
letic participation was within 3% of their enrollment among
undergraduates.31 Only seventeen schools fell into this category:
389. As the Policy Interpretation suggests, the percentage of female athletes is com-
pared with the percentage of female undergraduates.
390. E.g., Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univ., 198 F.3d 763, 765 (9th Cir. 1999); see
also Farrell, supra note 63, at 1041.
391. Other settlements suggest the 3% benchmark. Brake & Catlin, supra note 47, at 67.
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8/89 (9%) Division I-A schools; 4/50 (8%) Division I-AAA schools;
and 5/107 (5%) Division III schools.9
For the 1998-99 school year the numbers improve; 56 of the 329
schools in the sample met the 5% test: 23/92 (25%) Division I-A
schools; 14/65 (22%) Division I-AAA schools; and 19/172 (11%)
Division III schools. The numbers also improve with the 3% test:
15/92 (16%) Division I-A schools; 9/65 (14%) Division I-AAA
schools; and 8/172 (5%) Division III schools.
Because differences in football teams are part of the definitional
differences among these divisions, if football affected a school's
ability to comply with the proportionality provisions of Title IX,
one would expect to see differences in these "compliance rates." At
the 3% level, the difference in the compliance rates is slight; at the
5% level, it is larger but still fairly small. While twice as many Divi-
sion I-A schools met the 5% test as do Division III schools, both
divisions are football schools. Since Division I-A represents the
largest football programs, typically the most vocal opponents of
Title IX proportionality, one might expect any difference in Divi-
sion I-A and Division III to be reversed, with more Division III
schools meeting the 5% test. Still, Division I-A schools have larger
athletic budgets and have more financial flexibility to accommo-
date new athletic interests and abilities. Looking at the 2000 data,
the most striking figure is the change in compliance for Division I-
A schools. The percentage of schools meeting the 5% test remains
the same for Division I-AAA schools; this is also true of the per-
centage of schools meeting the 3% test at Division III schools.
There are bigger differences in terms of proportion of money
spent on recruitment. I compared the percentage of female ath-
letic participants with their percentage of the recruitment budget.
Using the same 5% test,39 3 more schools meet this proportionality
test, but there were bigger differences among the NCAA divisions.
In the 1999 data, of the 232 schools with usable information on
this measure, nearly one quarter came within the 5% test. There
were 12/89 (13.5%) Division I-A schools, 15/50 (30%) Division I-
AAA schools, and 30/93 (32%) Division III schools that meet the
test. Using the more stringent 3% test, the number of schools that
meet the test dropped in half, but the differences among the divi-
sions remained. There were 5/89 (6%) Division I-A schools, 11/50
392. Using the 1997 NCAA data, USA Today reported that 9 of 108 (8%) Division I-A
schools, the same number as in 1995, would meet the 5% proportionality test and that 12 of
78 (15%) Division I-AAA would also meet the test. Erik Brady & Tom Witosky, Title IX Im-
proves Women's Participation, USA TODAY, Mar. 3, 1997, at 4C.
393. The question asked here was for how many schools was the percentage spent on
women recruitment plus or minus 5% of the percentage of female athletic participants.
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(22%) Division I-AAA schools, and 16/93 (17%) Division III
schools that met the 3% test. The 2000 data is similar. Of the 307
schools with usable information on this measure, 27% come within
the 5% test. There were 15/92 (16%) Division I-A schools, 28/65
(43%) Division I-AAA schools, and 40-150 (27%) Division III
schools. Using the 3% figure, the number of schools that meet the
test drops, and only Division I-AAA is different from the other divi-
sions. There were 12/92 (13%) Division I-A schools, 15/65 (23%)
Division I-AAA schools, and 19/150 (13%) Division III schools.
Again, Division I-AAA, the non-football schools, show the best rate
of compliance and the biggest improvement.
TABLE 3
RECRUITMENT COMPLIANCE
1999 DATA
1997-98 SCHOOL YEAR
AT 5% LEVEL AT 3% LEVEL
DIVISION I-A 12/89 = 13.5% 5/89 = 6%
DIVISION I-AAA 15/50 = 30% 11/50 = 22%
DIVISION III 30/93 = 32% 16/93 = 17%
2000 DATA
1998-99 SCHOOL YEAR
AT 5% LEVEL AT 3% LEVEL
DIVISION I-A 15/92 = 16% 12/92 = 13%
DIVISION I-AAA 28/65 = 43% 15/65 = 23%
DIVISION III 40/150 = 27% 19/150 = 13%
I constructed a similar measure for athletic financial aid. I com-
pared the percentage of female athletic participants with their
percentage of the athletic financial aid. In the 1999 data, nearly
three-fourths of the Division I-A schools (65/88) met the 5% test9;
using the 3% test, less than half of the Division I-A schools met the
test (40/88) . 9 In the 2000 data, the numbers and percentages
394. Thus, an institution is in compliance if the percentage of athletic financial aid for
female athletes was within 5% of the percent of female athletes.
395. In the 1999 data, 52% (26/50) Division I-AAA schools met this 5% test; 38%
(19/50) met the 3% test. In the 2000 data, 48% (31/65) Division I-AAA schools met this 5%
test; 32% (21/65) met the 3% test. These figures may be misleading, however, because a
significant number of these schools give women athletes proportionately more aid than
their male athletes. The average ratio of male aid to female aid is about 100: 110; the mini-
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drop. At the 5% level, 64% of the Division I-A schools meet this
test (59/92); using the 3% level, only 40% of Division I-A schools
meet the test (37/92). Both of these compliance measures-
recruitment and aid-compare the recruitment or aid ratio with
the percentage of women athletic participants, not their represen-
tation in the undergraduate population. Thus, this comparison
asks only whether current women athletes receive their propor-
tional share of the aid and recruitment money.
TABLE 4
AID COMPLIANCE
DIVISION I-A
AT 5% LEVEL AT 3% LEVEL
1999 DATA 65/88 = 74% 40/88 = 45%
2000 DATA 59/92 = 64% 37/92 = 40%
Since 1997, the biggest differences between football and non-
football schools-or among divisions-is in revenue and ex-
penses.3 9 6 In Division I-A schools, revenues exceeded expenses in
both 1997 and 1999, but there was extraordinary growth in both
revenue and expenses in 1999.
mum ratio is 10:7, and the maximum ratio is 2:3. As the "aid compliance" figure con-
structed asks only if participation ratio minus the aid ratio is plus or minus 5% (or 3%), it
does not count those institutions where the participation ratio minus the aid ratio is greater
than plus 5% (or 3%).
Since Division III schools do not give athletic-related aid, they are not included in this
calculation.
396. The statute defines revenues as "gate receipts, broadcast revenues, appearance
guarantees and options, concessions, advertising. ... student activity fees, or alumni contri-
butions." 20 U.S.C. § 1092(g) (1) (I) (ii) (1998). It defines expenses as "grants-in-aid, salaries,
travel, equipment.... supplies.... [and] overhead." Id. at § 1092(g)(1)(J)(ii).
Tentative analysis of revenue and expenses information in the 2000 data suggests that the
amounts of revenue and expenses are consistent with those reported in 1999. There are too
many inconsistencies with how institutions reported the information, however, to permit a
parallel presentation of the information from the 1998-99 school year. Once the federal
government begins to collect the EADA reports and writes its own report, one can hope for
monitoring for consistency in reporting so that data across schools will be comparable.
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TABLE 5
AVERAGE REVENUE & EXPENSES
DIVISION I-A
REVENUE* EXPENSES*
1997** 1999, 1997"* 1999 t
FOOTBALL 5,925 8,156 3,168 4,879
MEN'S 2,316 3,134 968 1,430
BASKETBALL
OTHER 1,319 1,188 2,254 2,392
TOTAL 9,561 12,478 6,388 8,701
MEN'S
WOMEN'S 103 212 534 790
BASKETBALL
OTHER 476 717 1851 2,620
TOTAL 579 929 2,386 3,410
WOMEN'S
NOT 3,169 6,582 4,311 7,578
ALLOCATED
BY GENDER
GRAND 13,308 19,989 13,087 19,689
TOTAL
* dollars in thousands
- n = 93
t
n = 80
"not exact total due to rounding
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TABLE 5 (CONTINUED)
REVENUE* EXPENSES*
1997" 1999, 1997* 1999,
FOOTBALL 0 0 0 0
MEN'S 439 780 576 721
BASKETBALL
OTHER 140 469 774 905
TOTAL 579 1250 1,351 1,627
MEN'S
WOMEN'S 22 202 371 471
BASKETBALL
OTHER 102 355 706 888
WOMEN
TOTAL 124 557 1,059 1,359
WOMEN'S
NOT 738 1,778 392 1,076
ALLOCATED
BY GENDER
GRAND 1441 3585 2802 4061
TOTAL
*dollars in thousands
.= 69
tn =47
Revenue exceeded expenses in 1997 by $221,000. In 1999 the ex-
cess was $300,000, but the average amount of revenue and expenses
was considerably higher in 1999 than in 1997.397 Division I-A schools
have big-time football and basketball programs and are character-
ized by large state universities, 82% being public institutions. The
average undergraduate population of these 89 schools is 16,224 stu-
dents; however, the size of the institution ranges from a high of
37,615 undergraduate students to a low of 2,649 undergraduates.
On average women outnumber men as undergraduates (51%), and
at some schools, more than 60% of the undergraduates are
398
women.
397. Revenue and expenses both increased by 50%.
398. The lowest percentage of female enrollment is 16% and the largest is 60%. The 92
schools in the 2000 data have a similar profile.
DIVISION I-AAA
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TABLE 6
DIVISION I-A
AVERAGE RECRUITING EXPENDITURES
1997 n=94 $256,511 $84,550 $341,061
men (75%) women (25%) total
1999 n=89 $324,019 $125,086 $ 449,105
men (72%) women (28%) total
2000 n=92 $351,615 $143,932 $495,547
men (70%) women (30%) total
DIVISION I-A
AVERAGE ATHLETICALLY-RELATED STUDENT AID
1997 n=94" $1,575,821 $824,889 $2,400,710
men (66%) women (34%) total
1999 n=88 $2,014,564 $1,228,048 $3,242,612
men (62%) women (38%) total
2000 n=92 $2,136,233 $1,391,226 $3,527,459
men (61%) women (39%) total
*Estimated
The average recruiting expenditures increased by 32% from
1997 to 1999, with the expenditures for women's teams increasing
by 48%, while expenditures for men's teams increased by only
26%. In the end, women's share of the average recruiting expendi-
ture changed by only 3%. In the 2000 data, the women's share
increased only by another 2%. Athletically-related student aid also
grew from 1997 to 1999, increasing by 35%. Aid to women in-
creased by 49%, while aid to men increased by 28%. In the end the
women's average share of the aid changed by 4%. In the 2000
data, the women's shares increased by only 1%, but their share of
aid more closely approximated their athletic participation rate.
Division I-AAA schools operated at a deficit in both 1997 and
1999, but in 1999, these schools generated more revenues and
the losses were smaller than in 1997. In contrast to Division I-A,
expenses exceeded revenue in 1997 by $1,361,000; in 1999, Divi-
sion I-AAA lost less money, but there was still a difference between
revenue and expenses of $476,000. Like Division I-A schools, the
average amount of revenue and expenses was considerably higher
in 1999 than in 1997: revenue increased by 150%, and expenses
increased by slighdy less than 50%. Division I-AAA schools have
large basketball programs but no intercollegiate football programs
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and are a mix of public and private institutions, with 56% being
public institutions. The average undergraduate population of
these 50 schools is 6,299 students; however, the size of the institu-
tions ranges from a high of 16,704 undergraduate students to a low
of 743. Division I-AAA schools have a higher percentage of women
students. On average, women constitute 57% of the undergradu-
ates, and at some schools, more than 70% of the undergraduates
are women.59 The average participation rate for women at Division
I-AAA schools (48%) is higher than Division I-A schools, but it still
does not match average enrollment rate at Division I-AAA schools.
TABLE 7
1997 n=68 $47,934 $27,300 $75,234
men (75%) women (25%) total
1999 n=50 $56,640 $37,551 $94,191
men (60%) women (40%) total
2000 n=65 $58,721 $44,098 $102,819
men (57%) women (43%) total
DIVISION I-AAA
AVERAGE ATHLETICALLY-RELATED STUDENT AID
1997 n=68* $561,200 $537,342 $1,098,542
men (51%) women (49%) total
1999 n=50 $670,110 $715,123 $1,385,233
men (48%) women (52%) total
2000 n=65 $746,597 $825,219 $1,571,816
men (48%) women (52%) total
*Estimated
The average recruiting expenditures increased by 25% from
1997 to 1999; the expenditures for women's teams increased by
37.5%, while expenditures for men's teams increased by only 18%.
Women's share of the average recruiting expenditure changed by
15%. In the 2000 data, average recruiting expenditures increased
9%, and the women's share increased 3% from their 1999 levels.
399. Average enrollment for men at these Division I-AAA schools range from a low of
28% and a high of 50%. The 65 schools in the 2000 data have a similar profile.
DIVISION I-AAA
AVERAGE RECRUITING EXPENDITURES
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Athletically-related student aid also grew from 1997 to 1999, in-
creasing by 26%. Aid to women increased by 33%, while aid to
men increased by 19%. In the end, the women's average share of
the aid changed by only 3%, but it was the first time that the
women's share was more than the men's. In the 2000 data, athleti-
cally-related aid increased another 13%, but the ratio of male to
female aid remained the same.
It is not possible to make these same comparisons for Division
III schools because they are not required by the NCAA to report
the same revenue and expenses.4 0 0 Division III schools have smaller
football and basketball programs, do not give athletically-related
aid, and are characterized by small, private schools, with only 16%
being public. The average undergraduate population is 2,336, and
the institutions range from a low of 501 undergraduate students to
a high of 10,364. On average, women outnumber men as students,
52% to 48%, but the range is much greater than in other divisions,
as the average percentage of women undergraduates ranges from a
low of 11% to a high of 67%. °1 Only in this category was the in-
crease in 1999 for recruiting larger for men than for women. The
average recruiting expenditures increased by 50% from 1997 to
1999; while the expenditures for women's teams increased by 45%,
expenditures for men's teams increased by 51%. Women's share of
the average recruiting expenditure decreased by 1%. In the 2000
data, recruiting expenditures increased 6%, and both men's and
women's share increased by 6%.
TABLE 8
AVERAGE RECRUITING EXPENDITURES
DIVISION III
1997 n=217 $11,701 $4,983 $16,684
men (70%) women (30%) total
1999 n=107 $17,707 $7,239 $24,946
men (71%) women (29%) total
2000 n=150 $18,799 $7,689 $26,488
men (70%) women (30%) total
400. The 2000 data does include this information from at least some schools. Inconsis-
tencies with reporting prevent an analysis similar to that in the text for Division I schools.
Tentative analysis suggests, however, that Division III schools have negative net revenues but
spend 54% more on their athletic programs than they produce. In terms of specific sports,
the data suggest that schools spend 76% more on their football programs than they pro-
duce but only 49% more on women's basketball than it produces.
401. The 172 schools in the 2000 data have a similar profile.
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Next is a comparison of Division I-A football with Division III
football. Schools with big-time football programs have been the
most vocal opponents of Title IX and, in particular, its proportion-
ality provision. They originally argued that football should be
exempt from Title IX or that revenue producing sports should be
exempt from the calculations for proportionality. 402 It is difficult to
know what to make of these objections, given that almost 75% of
Division I-A schools have positive net football revenues.Y Compar
ing football revenues and expenses in 1999, the average positive
net revenue is $3.3 million. Negative net revenue can also be sig-
nificant. For the 80 division I-A schools in the 1999 sample, the
difference between revenues and expenses ranges from negative
$3.09 million to positive $16 million. In the 2000 data, average
positive net revenue is $4.3 million; for the 90 Division I-A schools
in the 2000 sample, the difference ranged from negative $2.7 mil-
lion to positive $21 million. In comparison, most Division III
football schools have negative net football revenues.0 4 Comparing
football revenues and expenses in 1999, the average is negative net
revenue of $69,000. The range is not as great for Division III
schools: they range from a low of negative $181,846 to a high of
$58,170. In 2000, the average is a negative net revenue of $75,000.
The range is greater-from a low of negative $307,000 to a high of
$70,000. Thus, it seems that if football matters to whether institu-
tions can comply with Title IX, it matters more for Division III
schools, where football is a money-loser. Without exact data, one
might expect Division III schools to find it easier to comply with
Title IX, with its focus on students and the prohibition of athleti-
cally-related student aid. But the numbers suggest that it is not
easier; these schools do not do a better job with Title IX compli-
ance. Given the money-making aspects of Division I-A football,
these schools have more opportunity to expand their athletic pro-
grams so as to comply more easily with Tide IX.
Finally, I compared expenses for women's sports at these foot-
ball schools with the schools' net football revenues. In the 1999
data, at Division I-A schools, the average expenses for women's
402. 40 Fed. Reg. at 24,128, 24,134 (1975).
403. Of the 80 Division I-A schools in the 1999 data, 58 (73%) had positive net reve-
nues, 1 (1%) broke even, and 21 (26%) had negative net revenues. Of the 90 Division I-A
schools in the 2000 data, 64 (71%) had positive net revenues and 26 (29%) had negative
net revenues.
404. In the 1999 data, of the 69 schools for which there was useful data on this meas-
ure, 13 (19%) had positive net revenues, 4 (6%) broke even, and 52 (75%) had negative net
revenues. In the 2000 data, of the 153 for which there was useful data on this measure, 31
(20%) had positive net revenues, 13 (9%) broke even, and 109 (71%) had negative net
revenues.
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sports was $3.4 million, ranging from a low of about $750,000 to a
high of $8.7 million. In the 2000 data, the average expenses for
women's sports was $4.2 million, ranging from a low of $1.1 mil-
lion to a high of $13.5 million. At Division III schools, the average
expenses for women's sports in 1999 was $296,807, ranging from a
low of $65,551 to a high of $796,737. In the 2000 data, the average
expenses were $311,000, with a low of $40,500 to a high of $1.1
million. Comparing these expenses with the schools' net football
revenues, the average ratio for Division I-A schools is 71:100, that
is, on average, football revenues have the potential to cover 70% of
the women's sports expenses. The minimum ratio is negative
113:100; the school loses $113 on football for every $100 it spends
on women's sports. The maximum ratio is 324:100, meaning that
the school could pay for women's sports three times and still have
positive net revenue. Overall, 25 out of 80 schools could cover
their women's sports expenses from their net football revenue
alone. 
4
0
5
The picture with Division III sports is considerably less clear.
Comparing women's sports expenses with the schools' net football
revenues, the average ratio is negative 32:100; that is, on average
schools lose $32 on football for every $100 it spends on women's
sports. The minimum ratio is negative 116:100; that is, the school
loses $116 for every $100 it spends on women's sports. The maxi-
mum ratio is 12:100, that is, at best football can cover only one-
eighth of its women's sports expenses. 6 Thus, it is less excusable
for Division I-A sports not to be in compliance with Tide IX's pro-
portionality provisions. It is more understandable with Division III
schools, where sports in general cost the university money. On the
other hand, because Division III football typically does not make
money, it is more difficult to support any priority claim for football
at a Division III school.
Another claim from opponents of Tide IX is that nonrevenue
men's teams have borne the brunt of Title IX compliance, with
schools eliminating men's teams in order to pay for women's
teams. 47 The sports offered by NCAA institutions, however, have
been remarkably stable over the last ten years. Given the rhetoric
about nonrevenue men's teams and institutions' gender-equity
405. Tentative analysis of the 2000 data suggests similar numbers.
406. Tentative analysis of the 2000 data suggests similar numbers but with even greater
ranges. The minimum ratio is negative 212.54:100 and the maximum ratio is 79:100.
407. See Weistart, supra note 84, at 195 n.15 (noting that the great controversy over the
extent to which the reduction in sponsorships of men's wresting, swimming, and gymnastics
is due to the efforts of schools to shift money over to women's sports).
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plans,4 °8 one might expect to see sharp increases in the number of
schools offering women's soccer, softball, and rowing as well as
sharp decreases in the number of schools offering men's wrestling
and gymnastics. The data shows the expected increases and de-
creases, but they are not as dramatic as one might expect.
TABLE 9
MEN'S SPORTS*
DIVISION I-A DIVISION I-AAA DIVISION III
1992 1999 1992 1999 1992 1999
basketball football basketball basketball uk football
football basketball track track uk basketball
track t  track tennis tennis uk soccer
golf golf golf golf uk track
baseball baseball baseball baseball uk baseball
tennis tennis soccer soccer uk tennis
* arranged according to largest number of schools offering particular men's sport
'track includes indoor track, outdoor track, and cross-country
uk = unknown
WOMEN'S SPORTS*
DIVISION I-A DIVISION I-AAA DIVISION III
1992 1999 1992 1999 1992 1999
basketball basketball basketball basketball uk basketball
volleyball trackt tennis track uk soccer
tennis tennis track tennis uk track
track volleyball volleyball volleyball uk volleyball
swimming soccer* softball soccer uk tennis
* arranged according to largest number of schools offering women's sport
track includes indoor track, outdoor track, and cross-country
** In 1999 in Division I-A softball is the seventh most offered sport after those listed
followed by golf. The women's teams with the largest number of participants are
rowing and track. All the rest have 28 or fewer. In Division I-AAA softball is the sixth
most offered sport. The women's teams with the largest number of participants are
rowing, track, and soccer. Division III women's teams are like Division I-AAA where
softball is the sixth most offered sport and the teams with the largest number of
participants are rowing and track.
uk = unknown
408. See supra text accompanying notes 348-51.
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The number of schools offering some men's sports declined.
For example, the number of Division I-A schools offering wrestling
declined from 44 schools (47%) in 1992 to 35 schools (39%) in
1999; those offering gymnastics declined from 24 (26%) to 15
(17%); and schools offering swimming declined from 72 (77%) to
58 (65%). The number of Division I-AAA schools offering wres-
ding declined from 17 (21%) to 10 (20%); those offering
swimming declined from 34 (41%) to 17 (34%), but there was no
difference in the number of schools offering gymnastics (3).
The number of schools offering some women's sports increased.
For example, the number of Division I-A schools offering soccer
increased from 21 (22%) in 1992 to 77 (87%) in 1999; those offer-
ing softball increased from 54 (57%) to 63 (71%); and schools
offering rowing increased from 0 in 1992 to 18 (20%) in 1999. The
number of Division I-AAA schools offering soccer increased from
28 (34%) in 1992 to 38 (76%) in 1999; those offering swimming
declined from 38 (46%) to 20 (40%); and 7 (14%) schools added
rowing by 1999. In Division III there were 12 (11%) new schools
offering rowing by 1999.
A different picture of Title IX and its application to intercolle-
giate athletics emerges through the information provided by the
schools in their EADA forms. For example, big-time football pro-
grams may make it easier to have successful women's athletic
programs, rather than support an exclusion or exemption from
the requirements of Title IX. Nearly 75% of Division I-A schools
report that their football revenues exceed their football expenses.
Twenty-five of these schools could pay for the expenses of their
women's programs through football net revenues alone. The aver-
age cash flow is negative at most Division III schools and,
somewhat surprisingly, these schools lag behind Division I schools
in their "participation compliance" measure. The data submitted
by the schools does not support the notion that there has been
wholesale elimination of men's sports in order to pay for women's
sports. The average number of male athletic participants has
dropped in Division I but only by less than 5% in Division I-A. And
in Division III, the average number of male athletic participants
has increased by almost 25%.
What is most remarkable about this data is the increase in reve-
nue and expenses, especially at Division I schools, suggesting that
compliance with Title IX is now a matter of will. The data shows
that a number of institutions are currently in compliance with
Title IX's proportionality test; others may be in compliance un-
der the second or third prong of the Policy Interpretation.
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Financial resources are available. The law is relatively clear. The
only remaining obstacle to compliance by Division I institutions is
either inertia or bad will. The issue in Division III schools is differ-
ent. Absence of positive net revenues limits the options of these
schools. Financial expansion of athletic programs seems unlikely
or such expansion will come at the cost of other, probably aca-
demic, programs at the universities and colleges. The unequal
status of women's sports at Division III schools is more glaring.
This difference between Division I and Division III schools, rather
than the existence of a football program, suggests the need for
more attention to Title IX at Division III schools.
CONCLUSION
Title IX should not be confused with other civil rights statutes.
When Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibit dis-
crimination on the basis of race, the statutes ask us to do what we
are already, at least theoretically, committed to do, that is, provide
equal treatment. Title IX also requires equal treatment, but it de-
mands more. Although its language parallels Title VI, Title IX
challenges our perceptions, asking us to think differently about
women in education. In the context of intercollegiate athletics,
Title IX forces us to answer whether men are inherently more in-
terested in sports than women, and thereby deserve to compete in
greater numbers.
Title IX also challenges the expectations of men, who for years
have reaped the benefit of disproportionate athletic opportunities.
A recent article opens with the line, "Bill Kelley went to [college]
with a dream,"9 and now because of Title IX he can't fulfill this
dream. This statement is meant to turn our sentiment in favor of
Billy, but at the expense of women who have, and continue to be,
underrepresented in intercollegiate athletics.
Title IX also challenges our notions of constitutionally accepted
outcomes. It questions whether separate but equal is always une-
qual, whether differences in men and women's sports are based on
real differences or grounded in stereotypes. It asks what to make of
a system that treats men and women the same but in which women
do not succeed on the same basis as men.
Ask the casual observer about women and intercollegiate athlet-
ics and he or she may think about the success of women in the
409. Beveridge, supra note 229, at 809.
[VOL. 34:1&2
FALL 2000-WINTER 2001] Gender and Intercollegiate Athletics 229
1996 summer Olympics. Women athletes have always been stars at
the Olympics-figure skaters Tara Lapinski and Kristi Yamaguchi,
swimmer Janet Evans, gymnast Mary Lou Retton-especially in
terms of television ratings and media coverage. But at the 1996
summer Olympics, it was the women's team sports that caught our
attention and held our imagination. United States women won
gold medals in softball, soccer, and basketball. Additionally, the
usual stars, women gymnasts, won a team gold medal.
The reasons to support equal rights for women in athletics, and
to work out what that means, go beyond the thrill of watching the
skill and power of women athletes in remarkable performances at
the Olympics or at a sold-out NCAA women's basketball tourna-
ment. Title IX and intercollegiate athletics are an important
context in which to work out definitions of equality because par-
ticipation in athletics is another important way to transform
perceptions about women and their supposed limitations.

